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This abstract discusses the objectives of war
termination from the perspective of the Soviet Union.
Specifically, considerations relating to the possibility of
limited Soviet objectives for terminating a war are
analyzed. A possible future war in Europe is the primary
example; it is argued that the political and military
dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of U.S. military
power from the continent might be sufficient Soviet
conditions for seeking war termination. The hypothesis
that the USSR would prefer to fight a conventional war (and
avoid using nuclear weapons) is examined as is the Soviet
need to maintain cohesion within the Warsaw Pact. It is
concluded that the limits of conventional warfare and the
constraints of alliance dynamics could interact in Soviet
strategy to limit objectives for terminating a future war
in Europe. An appendix supplements and contrasts the
thesis text by reviewing Western views on war termination.
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I. INTRODUCTION
War termination is commonly described as a process that
ends a war (Abt 1985, 30; Handel 1978, 52). However, the
output of that process may be more than just the end of the
war; it may be the fulfillment of a prerequisite objective
that makes termination possible. In other words, war
termination may correspond to the attainment of an
objective; from the perspective of a belligerent, the
attainment of an objective and the conditions for war
termination may be synonymous. This thesis examines the
relationship between Soviet objectives and war termination,
focusing on the hypothesis that, in the event of war, the
Soviet Union may pursue limited objectives, thus limited
war termination conditions.
It is commonly believed in the West that the Soviets
would accept no less than total, unconditional victory.
Moreover, such a Soviet victory is often presumed to be the
result of a strategic nuclear war. However, Soviet
objectives in a war may be contingent on political aims,
military capabilities, and alliance constraints and,
therefore, may be subject to limitation.
Furthermore, nuclear war scenarios may neglect the
emerging trends in arms control to reduce nuclear arsenals
as well as the increased awareness of potential ecological
difficulties that could diminish the utility of nuclear
operations for the belligerents. The destructive potential
of war could encourage the Soviets to terminate the
conflict short of decisive, total victory, especially if
the war were fought with conventional weapons.
A content analysis of Soviet writings is conducted in
the second chapter, presenting evidence that the Soviets
recognize the practical reality of limited objectives and
may seek a conditional, rather than a total, victory in a
future war.
The two subsequent chapters focus on a future war in
Europe. First, it is argued that the Soviets may seek the
political and military dissolution of NATO and the
decoupling of U.S. military power from Europe as conditions
for terminating the war. Defeating NATO may entail only its
neutralization and not necessarily its complete
obliteration. Rather than absolute hegemony over Western
Europe, the Soviets may settle for a more realistic
functional hegemony.
Second, constraints imposed on Soviet war objectives by
the Warsaw Pact are discussed. It is proposed that the
limits of Soviet control, the faults in alliance cohesion,
and the importance of the NSWP militaries to Soviet
strategy could interact to constrain Moscow's objectives
for terminating a war against NATO.
An appendix reviews Western theories regarding the
relationship between political objectives and war
termination. The Appendix supplies cross references to the
text of the thesis and serves to contrast Western and
Soviet perspectives on the objective of war termination.
II. THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE OF WAR TERMINATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Soviet writings emphasize the imperative of terminating
a war only upon the attainment of victory. Marshal of the
Soviet Union (MSU) Ogarkov wrote in 1979 that a future
world war would be "a decisive clash between two opposing
world socio-economic systems-socialism and capitalism."
( Soviet Military Encyclopedia , 93) In this future world
war, Ogarkov continues, the "armed forces will also pursue
the most decisive political and strategic goals without any
compromise"; the aim of the war would be "victory." ( Soviet
Military Encyclopedia 1979, 93-94) However, the Soviets
have recognized that achieving victory in war is
problematic. An article in the restricted journal of the
Soviet General Staff Voyennaya mysl
'
( Military Thought )
noted that
military strategy is faced, as previously, with a most
difficult problem—development of a theory of a war's
possible outcome, or a theory of victory in war. Military
strategy has always been confronted with this problem.
(Sokolovskiy and Cheredichenko 1968, 391)
Thus, although the Soviets claim their aim in a war is
victory, they apparently understand the difficulty of
victoriously terminating a war. It is uncertain, in a
future war, whether the Soviets would actually seek the
decisive end that is typically declared or whether the
Soviets plan for limited objectives and thus limited
termination conditions. As observed by Robert Arnett, "it
is important to remember that a Soviet statement on
victory, by itself, does not tell us what kind of victory
they might perceive as being possible." (1979, 176) Thus,
it must be asked, how might the Soviets define victory in a
future war?
The ultimate goal for the Soviet Union appears to be
the victory of communism throughout the world. As recently
as 1987, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev declared: "We
are moving towards a new world, the world of communism. We
shall never turn off that road." (1987a, 30) Gorbachev
had, previous to this declaration, identified capitalism as
"the society which history has doomed" (1986c, 13) ; the
demise of capitalism is the prerequisite for the ultimate
Soviet political goal.
The Soviets would likely prefer to achieve the victory
of communism without resorting to war. In fact, the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) concluded in the
1950s that, although the victory of communism was a
foregone conclusion, war was no longer inevitable; neither
conclusion has since been rescinded (Tyushkevich 1986, 9) .
Recent statements by General Secretary Gorbachev
similarly reject the inevitability of war. For example,
Gorbachev has told the American public, in an interview for
Time magazine, that the Soviet Union "will never start
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war." (Grunwald and others 1985, 25) Moreover, Gorbachev
has claimed "that the old notions of war as a means of
attaining political objectives have become outdated."
(1986d, 3)
However, Gorbachev's statements were most likely
propaganda for popular consumption rather than declarations
of doctrinal tenets. Gorbachev does not state that, should
a war occur, political objectives would be absent.
Although war is no longer inevitable, according to the
Soviets, its outbreak is still possible. As expressed by
MSU Ogarkov, "[t]he absence of a fatal inevitability of
war... by no means signifies elimination of the possibility
of a war occurring in the contemporary era." (1982)
Therefore, the ability to "deliver crushing counter-attacks
at the enemy so as to overwhelm it under whatever
circumstances" (Ogarkov 1986, 1) is a salient feature of
Soviet military doctrine.
Soviet political objectives would probably remain
primary should a war occur. The Soviets have long believed
that
war cannot be understood without first understanding its
connection with the policies preceding it, without a
study of the policies pursued by two warring sides long
before the war.... The political interests of the classes
at war and of their states determine the war aims....
(Byely and others 1972, 9-10)
Presuming that Soviet peacetime policies seek the global
victory of communism, the statement above would imply a
similar aim during war.
Current Soviet leadership roots are in a Bolshevik past
that defined victory as the complete destruction of the
adversary's social, economic, and governmental system; for
the Bolsheviks, their Marxist-Leninist ideology aimed at
"polnaya pobieda" or total victory (Vigor 1983, 42).
Although roots form an ideological foundation, time
involves a branching out in diverse directions; adjustment
and growth affect the form but not the content. Thus, while
total victory may be an ultimate objective, war may only be
a means to this objective, limited to preparing the
conditions for a final communist victory.
Lenin adopted the Clausewitzian dictate that "war is
simply the continuation of politics by other [specifically
forceful] means." (Ivanov 1969, 409). Expanding on that,
Marshal Sokolovskiy, editor of the book Military Strategy ,
described the Marxist-Leninist position "that war is not an
aim in itself, but only a tool of politics." (Sokolovskiy,
ed. 19 68, 14) Therefore, it may be presumed that the USSR's
long-term political objectives involve total victory;
however, a specific war may be terminated short of the
realization of the Soviet Union's ultimate intentions after
having satisfactorily advanced the political aim.
One Soviet source quotes Lenin's statement that war
"does not alter that direction in which policy was
developing before the war but rather accelerates that
development." (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 74) By
accelerating policy, it does not necessarily mean that war
will attain the ultimate objectives of policy. Although the
ultimate Soviet objective is declared as the global victory
of socialism, Soviet writings recognize that "[w]ar can
accelerate maturation of objective and subjective
preconditions" for such an event (Volkogonov, ed. 1984).
This chapter reviews the content of Soviet writings
relevant to objectives for terminating a war. The vast
majority of Soviet writings indicate a requirement for a
decisive, total victory in war. However, this chapter
presents evidence that the Soviets recognize the practical
necessity of pursuing limited objectives and therefore may
seek a more conditional victory in a future war.
In presenting the argument for limited Soviet war
termination objectives, this chapter concentrates on the
socio-political aspect of Soviet military doctrine as it
relates to "the nature of the political goals and strategic
missions of a state in war...." (Gareyev 1985) The other
aspect of Soviet military doctrine, the military-technical,
which is concerned with "the forms and modes of conduct of
operations and a war as a whole" (Ogarkov, ed. 1983c), will
be discussed in the next chapter.
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B. TOTAL VICTORY
Soviet writings on future war characteristically
predict a decisive victory for socialism. For example, MSU
Grechko confidently exclaimed "that victory in this war
would go to us--to the socialist social system." (1973, 16)
To ensure this victory, the Soviets claim the need to
destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons, economy, government
and military control centers, and groupings of military
forces ( Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 282). Moreover, the Soviets
require "a rapid and decisive defeat of the aggressor" to
eliminate "any possibilities of his further conducting
war...." (Povaliy 1968, 71) Finally, to achieve total
victory "it is necessary to complete the rout of remaining
and resisting formations of enemy armed forces and to
occupy important strategic areas on enemy territory."
(Iovlev 1963, 9)*
Hence, common to Soviet literary discussion on victory
is an uncompromising aim of complete military, political,
and economic defeat of the enemy. Even in discussing topics
seemingly less conducive to bellicose declarations, the
Soviet conceptual framework offers insight into the
unconditional nature of Soviet objectives for terminating a
war.
* See Appendix, section B. for a discussion, from a
Western perspective, of the concept of total victory and
its potential problems.
1 . Peace and Defense
In the West, peace is a concept eagerly and often
naively pursued; in the Kremlin, peace is synonymous with
communist victory. In addition to the paraphrase noted
earlier, the famous Clausewitzian statement on politics and
war was also twisted by Lenin into: "politics is the
continuation of war by other means." (Milovidov and Kozlov,
eds. 1972, 43) In other words, war is a continuing process
that is conducted using political means during periods
described in the West as peace.
The Soviet view of peace equates to the extinction
of capitalism and the global domination of communism. As
expressed in an article by two professors at the Lenin
Military-Political Academy, "100 per cent durability of
peace stems from the elimination of the source of war as a
result of the transition from capitalism to socialism.
"
(Milovidov and Zhdanov 1980, 99) More directly, another
Soviet source notes " [ 1] iquidation of the exploitation
system and transition of all mankind to socialism and
Communism will eliminate the causes of wars, with the
disappearance of military conflicts themselves." (Milovidov
and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 14)
Similarly, the Soviet concept of military defense,
although inclusive of the typical Western notions of
holding ground and repelling attack, is distinctly
offensive in nature. In broad terms, the Soviets describe
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their military doctrine as defensive, but they are poised
to decisively respond "should the imperialists succeed in
unleashing" a war ( Soviet Military Encyclopedia 1979, 93).
However, the noted Soviet military writer Y. Rybkin
defined the term "unleashing war" as only applicable to
"the aggressive forces, since it is they who are guilty of
all wars without exception, and since any just war
( regardless of who attacked first ) is caused by the
creation of unbearable conditions and oppression [emphasis
added]." (1973a, 42) Thus, the Soviets may actually
initiate attack yet perceptually categorize their actions
as defensive.
Although Soviet military strategy differentiates
between offensive and defensive operations, it is admitted
that "the methods of waging a defensive battle approach
those of an offensive." ( Sokolovskiy , ed. 1968, 296)
Similarly, Colonel General Gareyev, in his book on the
Soviet military theorist M.V. Frunze, emphasized that "the
main thing on the defensive. .
.
[was] the launching of an
attack against the enemy and the winning of initiative in
order to fundamentally alter the situation." (1985)
Furthermore, the Soviet concept of defense seems
nearly identical to Western notions of pre-emption. For
example, in a description of nuclear war, one Soviet source
noted that
11
[e]mployment of nuclear weapons in the defensive
operation and engagement increases the stability of
defense and enables the defending forces to mount heavy
strikes against the opposing enemy force even before the
attack begins [emphasis added]. (Milovidov and Kozlov,
eds. 1972, 106-107)
In addition, the Soviet Military Encyclopedia Dictionary
contains the term "Aggressiveness of Defense," which
includes in its definition the need to strike "during the
time when the adversary is preparing for an attack...."
(Ogarkov, ed. 1983a)
Peace and defense in the Soviet lexicon contain no
trace of the passivity or restraint that is characteristic
of Western interpretations of these terms. It seems evident
that the Soviet concepts of peace and defense entail the
decisive defeat of the adversary.
2. Decisive Intent
Soviet writings emphasize the inevitable decisive
aims of a future war. Although a paraphrase of Frunze's
remarks on future war, Gareyev's statement that "there will
not be any limited goals in a war" (1985) may be currently
relevant. In a description of the socio-political aspect of
Soviet military doctrine on future war, the authors of
Marxism-Leninism on War and Army suggest that "every side
will pursue the most decisive aims." (Byely and others
1972, 304)
Furthermore, the Soviets indicate that the sides in
a future war will be coalitions fighting for "resolute
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political and military objectives." (Milovidov and Kozlov
1972, 100) Therefore, a coalition war "will be waged
without compromise." (Kurkotkin 1985b, 20)*
The coalition character of a future war will not
geographically limit the war, according to Soviet sources.
Marshal Ogarkov has predicted that a future war "will
acquire unprecedented spatial scope, encompass entire
continents and ocean expanses and unavoidably drag into its
orbit the majority of the countries of the world." (1985)
Ogarkov claims that such a world war "will continue until
total victory over the enemy is achieved." (1985) Thus, the
USSR must maintain "the ability to inflict upon [the
aggressor] crushing retaliatory strikes and to destroy him
in any situation." (Ogarkov 1985)
Nuclear war is distinguished in Soviet writings as
the most decisive means of fighting a world war. One source
recognized the task of a nuclear war to be the "destruction
of the entire system of capitalism...." (Byely and others
1972, 106-107) An article from Voyennaya mysl' states that
the military-political goals of a nuclear war would be
decisive and the nature of military operations in such a
war would be "extremely intense, decisive, and non-
compromising." ( Zemskov 1969, 438)
* See Chapter IV for discussion of why a future
coalition war might be more limited than these Soviet
declarations imply.
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In a world war, nuclear or otherwise, Soviet
writings describe the requisite total utilization of a
nations resources to ensure victory (Milovidov and Kozlov
1972, 59). History, according to Soviet sources, has proven
that the failure to fully utilize a country's capabilities
results in defeat (Ogarkov, ed. 1983b).
The full application of Soviet resources to a war
effort includes economic, ideological, and diplomatic
activity in addition to military operations to achieve the
political aims of the war; these, the Soviets maintain,
"are all means of waging war, its component parts." (Byely
and others 1972, 11-12) By delineating the requirement to
dedicate all resources to the war effort, the Soviets may
be implying the decisive nature of their objectives.
Accentuating the apparent decisive intent of Soviet
military doctrine is its absolute and offensive nature
(Kozlov, ed. 1971, 65). As proclaimed by General Kozlov,
Chief of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, "[o]nly with
a decisive offensive can one achieve total defeat of the
enemy, seize his territory and undermine his capability to
continue prosecution of the war." (1981, 37) Gareyev
plainly stated that "if a war is imposed on us, our
military strategy will be decisive and offensive." (1985)
An offensive strategy maintains the initiative and,
thus, the capability to impose "the will of the attacker on
the defending side." (Gareyev 1985) By supplementing the
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offensive with surprise, the Soviets apparently expect to
paralyze enemy response capability (Gareyev 1985). Possibly
as a result of surprise, Soviet writings emphasize the
importance of the initial period of a war and the potential
to achieve "the basic strategic goals" during this period
(Lomov, ed. 1973, 138).
A primary target in the Soviet offensive would
likely be the morale of the enemy forces. As one Soviet
source notes
[o]nly powerful blows against the aggressor and his
troops are able to erode and then to destroy their
fighting spirit. Therefore, in preparing to rebuff
possible imperialist aggression, the Soviet state and its
Armed Forces are firmly resolved to rout the aggressor by
the strength of their weapons and morale. (Byely and
others 1972, 241)
Attacking the morale of the enemy while preserving
Soviet morale is essential to the military strategy of the
USSR. In the book The People, the Army, the Commander , it
is stressed that "the morale of the people and the troops
is one of the most important factors determining the course
and outcome of a war." ( Skirdo 1970, 49)
3 . Class War
The Soviets' claim that their troop morale is
superior because it is underpinned by the just nature of
their ideological cause and the righteousness of the
proletariat class. A future war would test the strength of
morale, according to Soviet writings, because such a war
would not merely be a military confrontation but rather "a
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revolutionary class war." (Gareyev 1985) Moreover, it is
the "bitter class nature" of this war that "predetermines
the extremely decisive nature of the political and military
aims of the belligerents." (Povaliy 1967, 70)
Thus, a future world war would "sharply intensify
the class struggle and accelerate the victory of the
working class." (Byely and others 1972, 21) Although war is
not deemed essential for the victory of the working class,
the effects of war are expected to aggravate "the internal
and external contradictions of capitalism, " erode state
control, and foster "a deep political crisis of the whole
system of imperialism, " thereby creating conditions
conducive to successful revolution (Byely and others 1972,
75).
For the international working class, a future war
"will be a holy war for freedom and independence, a just
liberation war." (Byely and others 1972, 73) The Soviets
write that the power of the working masses is great enough
to either "demand the resignation of the government"
pursuing aggressive aims or to physically turn upon the
government and conduct a just socialist revolution (Byely
and others 1972, 105).
Other activities such as sabotage and guerrilla
warfare are suggested as potential roles for the
"international proletariat" in support of the socialist
victory (Byely and others 1972, 121). In other words, the
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global working class is expected to be an ally of the
Soviet cause in a future war and to contribute to the
defeat of the capitalist states; the commonality of class
interests creates an obligation to support Soviet
objectives.
Whether the Soviets actually expect to establish
"dictatorships of the proletariat throughout the world" is
uncertain (Cimbala and Douglass, eds. [1988}, 330). However,
although highly rhetorical and propagandistic, Soviet
writings on the revolutionary, class aspect of future war
illustrate the uncompromising goals conveyed to the Soviet
population and to people sympathetic to the Soviet cause.
Certainly, the Soviets have not abandoned the
appeal to the working class as illustrated by a recent
statement by Gorbachev, claiming that the working class
"has the potential to play a decisive role, especially at
abrupt turning points in history." (Gorbachev 1987a, 26)
Gorbachev would perhaps categorize war as a sufficiently
abrupt event to qualify as a "turning point."
4 . Preparation
The Soviets stress the need to prepare for war in
advance. As the authors of Military Strategy note: "victory
in a future war will not come by itself. It must be
thoroughly prepared for and assured." ( Sokolovskiy, ed.




that "[v]ictory in war is forged in peacetime." (Kruchinin
1963, 25)
Modern war has complicated the problem of peacetime
preparations. The Soviets note that because major strategic
objectives can be realized in the initial period of the
war, "not only the course but the outcome of the war" may
be quickly decided (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 126).
Thus, prewar preparation has acquired greater urgency for
the Soviets, specifically in the areas of ideological
indoctrination and economic defense (Milovidov and Kozlov,
eds. 1972, 126).
a. Political-Ideological Indoctrination
The political-ideological indoctrination of the
population, especially the military, is integral to Soviet
peacetime preparations for war. The importance of such
indoctrination is reflected in the Soviet observation that
"it is impossible to begin a war or conduct it, let alone
conclude it victoriously, without careful ideological
preparation of the people and the army." (Milovidov and
Kozlov, eds. 1972, 216)
Political indoctrination, especially in the
Soviet and NSWP (non-Soviet Warsaw Pact) militaries, is a
persistent, pervasive, repetitive program designed to
develop personnel "in a spirit of devotion to the ideas and
cause of communism and of hatred for its enemies."
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(Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 220) More recently,
Soviet Army General Gribkov, the Chief of Staff and First
Deputy Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed
Forces, described the need to instill "a burning hate for
imperialists...." (1987, 8)
Successful communication and absorption of the
ideological precepts, particularly for military personnel,
has been described as "[t]he most important condition for
strengthening the military might of the Soviet state."
(Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 220) In war, states
Marshal Kutakhov, CINC (Commander-in-Chief) of the Soviet
Air Forces, a successful indoctrination program would
provide "a strong offensive impulse to the troops at the
time of the transition of the Soviet Army to the decisive
offensive." (1983, 21) In addition, by ingraining a hatred
of the enemy into the military personnel, the Soviets
expect to create zealous forces eager "to achieve complete
victory...." ( Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 330)
Primary among the requirements for the
indoctrinated troops, as well as civilians, is a fervent
sense of heroism. The Soviets are told that it would be an
honor and privilege to give one's life for the cause of
victory. An indoctrination lesson on the Soviet military
oath emphasizes
[t]he highest form of bravery and courage, the highest
understanding of one's duty and of the oath are the
deliberate sacrifice of oneself for the overall success,
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self-sacrifice for the sake of the common victory.
(Babenko 1982, 42)
A recent article on Soviet military doctrine
reiterates the need to indoctrinate the individual
serviceman "with the ability to fight to his last drop of
blood and with the willingness to sacrifice himself to
achieve success in battle and in a fight." (Kostev 1987, 4)
b. Economic Preparation
Economic preparation relates to the ability of
the USSR to support the military effort throughout a future
war. The Soviet economy is expected to survive and supply
military and domestic needs, even in a nuclear war (Akimov
and Illin 1984, 80). The wartime economy is expected to
absorb damage yet "provide new units." ( Sokolovskiy, ed.
1968, 321) As one Soviet source emphasizes, it is
"impossible to support combat operation without current
production"; thus, the wartime economy is integral to
military success (Volkogonov, ed. 1984).
Soviet civil defense is apparently not a
humanitarian gesture on the part of the Politburo but
rather a system designed "to ensure the required conditions
for normal activity of all governmental control agencies
during the course of the war and the effective functioning
of the national economy." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 332)
Soviet writings proclaim the economy important
enough not only to affect but to determine the outcome of a
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war (Byely and others 1972, 218). The performance of the
Soviet economy in World War II has been called "a decisive
factor in the victory over nazi Germany." (Byely and others
1972, 226) Furthermore, it is the experience of
continuously economically supporting a war effort during
WWII that the Soviets claim to be currently valuable and
relevant (Kurkotkin 1985a, 29).
Given the apparent importance of the economy to
Soviet military strategy, underlying motivations to
Gorbachev's "perestroika" or economic restructuring may be
revealed. According to the new CPSU program of 1986, the
purpose of perestroika is to hasten the "all-around
progress and advance toward communism" through the
"acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development."
("The CPSU Program," 131) Success in perestroika would see
a "qualitative transformation" of the Soviet economy and,
thus, Soviet society to an advanced level ("The CPSU
Program" 1986, 131).
From a warfighting perspective, a stronger,
more capable economy would likely be reflected in a more
lethal military. Moreover, in a conventional war, a vital
economy may be more secure (compared to potential
conditions in a nuclear war) and may have a greater effect
on the outcome of a prolonged war.
Pol itical - ideological indoctrination and
economic preparation reinforce foundations necessary to
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support a decisive war effort. Many Soviet sources recall
the World War II motto "Everything for the front,
everything for victory" (Grechko 1975, 49), probably
indicating the future relevance of this rallying cry.
However, while comprehensive Soviet activities will likely
be consumed in the quest for victory, the extent of that
victory may not necessarily reflect the totality of the
overall Soviet effort.
C. LIMITED VICTORY
Although Soviet writings predominantly emphasize the
absolute war termination objective of total victory, there
are indications that the Soviets accept the utility of
limited objectives.
Although Gareyev writes of the "principle of a partial
victory" (1985), it would be a misinterpretation to assume
he was referring to anything more than tactical or
operational military activities. Rather, Gareyev appears to
be contradicting the thesis presented in Military Strategy
that victory in a future war will result from a "one-time
application of the entire might of a state" and not from
the additive effects of "partial successes." ( Sokolovskiy,
ed. 1968, 12). According to Gareyev, operational and
tactical scale victories are still prerequisites of success
in war (1985). Thus, Gareyev' s comment on the importance of
partial victory is directed at operational and tactical
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victories and is not applicable to discussion of Soviet
limited strategic objectives for terminating a war.
However, of greater relevance is the potential for
limited objectives inherent in the interdependence of
politics and war in Soviet strategic thought. According to
Soviet writings, politics, or political goals, is
attributed "the decisive role not only in the preparations
for war but also in its conduct." (Byely and others 1972,
16)
Although Soviet military doctrine is tacitly respected
by many Western military analysts for its warfighting
orientation (in contrast to the declaratory confusion of
Western military strategy), the Soviets have acknowledged
that
[i]n a number of cases it is possible that attacks
will even be made against objectives which are not
of great military and economic importance, but
which are advantageous from a political viewpoint.
(Shirokov 1968, 322-323)
Political goals guide Soviet military decisions;
thus, political goals determine and direct the entire
"strategic plan of the war," aimed at the defeat of the
enemy (Byely and others 1972, 17).
However, the Soviets note that "politics takes into
account not only the aims of the war but also those of the
post-war settlement and subordinates the conduct of the war
to the attainment of these aims." (Byely and others 1972,
17) Implicit in this statement is the recognition that the
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post-war political alignment is contingent on the course of
the war; therefore, Soviet objectives may be more fluid
than is commonly accepted.
Although the Soviets stress the aim of completely
destroying the enemy, this is dependent upon the political
and strategic goals of the war (Dzhelaukhov 1966, 160).
Thus, the extent of these goals will define the limits of
the war. As noted in an article in Voyennaya mysl ' ,
"political motives can force the abandonment of strikes
against extremely important economic and military targets
or their implementation with smaller forces and on a
selective basis." (Shirokov 1968, 322)
Furthermore, while the Soviets describe the process of
simultaneous and comprehensive destruction of the enemy's
deep strategic rear in the event of a war, they seemingly
modify this by stating that "the belligerents will strive
to select from the objectives those which have the greatest
influence on the course and outcome of the armed struggle."
(Shirokov 1968, 313) Again, this would seem to place limits
on Soviet military actions, dictated by political
considerations
.
Recent Soviet writings strongly suggest limited
military objectives, determined by political
considerations. It must be noted that attainment of a
Soviet strategic objective entails a basic change in the
"strategic and the military-political situation, and will
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have an effect on the entire subsequent course of the armed
conflict." ( Kruchinin 1963, 12) Given this, a 1984 article
in Voyennaya mysl
'
, cited by military analysts Phillip
Petersen and Notra Trulock, explains:
Limited strategic objectives could be to annihilate an
armed forces group of the enemy in a theater or a certain
sector of a theater, to destroy the economic and military
potential of one or several enemy nations, to disrupt the
state administration and war directing systems of the
enemy, to remove from the war one or several nations of
an enemy alliance, etc. (Kuznetsov 1984 quoted in
Petersen and Trulock 1987, 12)
Thus, strategic objectives can be limited in the military
sense; additionally, restraint in political aims is
implied.
Explicit in the same article is the indication that,
the specific contents of strategic objectives depend on
the political objectives of the nations in a war; on the
economic, political, and morale capabilities, and on the
composition and fighting strength of the armed forces of
the opposing sides; on the weapons being used; and on the
geographical conditions. (Kuznetsov 1984 quoted in
Petersen and Trulock 1987, 12)
Therefore, political objectives may vary depending on the
correlation of opposing forces and the type of war being
fought. Given the Soviet emphasis on calculating the
correlation of forces, practical factors that are
inherently more restrictive than ideological considerations
would seem to be taken into account in Soviet military
thought.
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1. Correlation of Forces
The correlation of forces is a concept that
inherently imposes limits on Soviet objectives. It is a
comparison of the "economic, military, and moral-political
potentials" of probable adversaries that can determine the
inevitable victor in a war (Anureyev 1967, 241). The fact
that the correlation is variable over time would seem to
imply that objectives conform to the correlation; otherwise
capabilities would not correspond to political objectives.
Capabilities, the Soviets recognize, determine
whether "war aims, plans and concepts of military
operations are realistic..." (Skirdo 1970, 86) Thus, the
Soviets emphasize the need for a "sober calculation of the
correlation of forces between us and our adversary."
(Skirdo 1970, 89) Moreover, it is observed that
[exaggeration of one's own and underestimation of the
enemy's forces as well as ignoring the adversary's
economic, moral, and military potential lead to
adventurism, to unrealistic war plans, and, in the final
analysis, to total failure. (Skirdo 1970, 89)
It seems that failure to constrain objectives within the
limits of capability leads to defeat; it is unlikely that
the cautious Soviets would consciously commit themselves to
such an outcome.
Military power is the most critical element
within the correlation of forces. According to the Soviets,
"victory and defeat of the warring states (coalitions), the
course and the outcome of wars, depends on the whole
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directly on the correlation of their military power."
(Byely and others 1972, 211) However, "supremacy in
military power only makes victory possible"; even "great
supremacy" does not "guarantee victory." (Byely and others
1972, 212)
Although the Soviets claim that after World War
II "the correlation of forces in the world had changed
radically in favor of socialism" (Ogarkov 1982), it is
unlikely they assume victory has been guaranteed.
Militarily, the Soviets recognize that "in order to achieve
victory it is essential to have a mastery of all forms of
combat, to learn to supplement one form of combat with
another with maximum swiftness." (Milovidov and Kozlov,
eds . 1972, 105) The types of weapons employed by the
Soviets to achieve military-political objectives may, in
turn, reflect the scope of the objectives pursued.
2 . Nuclear or Conventional War
The nature of nuclear war is largely unknown. The
awesome destructive power of the weapons in question
commonly leads to assumptions concerning the totality and,
possibly, the finality of a nuclear war. Early Soviet
writings on nuclear war reflected the perception that such
a war would be the ultimate conflict, terminating with a
decisive Soviet victory.
For example, a 1968 article in Voyennaya mysl
'
proclaimed that "if imperialism commits a crime and plunges
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mankind into the abyss of nuclear war, it will perish, and
not 'both sides', not socialism...." (Bochkarev, 15)
Similarly, in 1972, a Soviet book on Lenin and contemporary
war indicated that "[t]here is profound error and harm in
the disorientating claims of bourgeois ideologues that
there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war"
(Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 17); clearly, the USSR is the
expected victor.
Expectations of victory in a nuclear war entail
belief in the political utility of such a war. A Soviet
military writer noted in 1973 that "neither the nature of
the modern era nor nuclear weapons have changed the
position that nuclear war... would be an extension of
policy." (Rybkin 1973b, 103) Moreover, nuclear war was
considered "even more 'political" due to its ability to
finally resolve the conflict between capitalism and
socialism (Byely and others 1972, 29).
Thus, in the 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet writings
heralded nuclear war, should it occur, as the final and
total political solution to the conflict between socialism
and capitalism. Political objectives would necessarily be
unconditional and limits would be nonexistent.
However, some Western analysts detected a shift in
Soviet nuclear declaratory posture beginning in the second
half of the 1970s. Specifically, Brezhnev's speech at Tula
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in January 1977 is identified as a watershed in Soviet
nuclear policy.*
At Tula, Brezhnev publicly denounced goals of
superiority and first strike capability. Specifically, he
stated, "the allegations that the Soviet Union is going
beyond what is sufficient for defense, that it is striving
for superiority in armaments with the aim of delivering a
'first strike,' are absurd and utterly unfounded."
(Brezhnev 1977, 3) Furthermore, Brezhnev declared a
willingness to reduce nuclear arsenals (1977, 3).
Certain analysts seized Brezhnev's remarks as an
unequivocal Soviet acceptance of the "inutility of nuclear
war as a rational instrument of policy." (FitzGerald 1986,
25) Authoritative Soviet sources have, in fact, followed
Brezhnev in denying the relevance of nuclear war. For
example, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet air forces
and deputy minister of defense Marshal Kutakhov declared:
any aggressors' plan to unleash nuclear war and in doing
so to gain victory are senseless. If such a war breaks
out it will inevitably lead to the death of entire
peoples, to colossal destruction and to catastrophic
consequences for civilization and life on earth itself.
(1983, 22)
A noted Soviet military professor concluded that "counting
on victory in a nuclear war is dangerous madness";
furthermore, such a war is no longer "a question of victory
* For further discussion see Fitzgerald 1986
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or defeat, but rather of destruction or existence."
(Volkogonov 1985, 5)
More recently, Gorbachev has identified the USSR as
"a staunch adversary of nuclear war in any variant."
(1986a, 4) Gorbachev's comment may be particularly
significant within the overall context of his arms control
initiatives and Soviet military doctrine. In 1986,
Gorbachev expressed the desire to eliminate all nuclear
weapons by the year 2000 (1986b, A13).
Furthermore, Gorbachev told the 27th Party Congress
of the intent to restrict "military potential within the
grounds of reasonable sufficiency." (1986c, 63) Such
"sufficiency" would be capable of "repulsing any possible
aggression but inadequate for conducting offensive
actions." (Gorbachev 1987b, 6)
However, as previously discussed, the Soviet
conceptual framework is largely alien to Western
interpretation. Although presumably restrained in nature,
Soviet military sufficiency may entail few restrictions.
Soviet Minister of Defense Yazov included in his discussion
of sufficiency the need, if attacked, to "give a crushing
rebuff to the aggressor" (1987, 5), a requirement no
different from prior Soviet military postures.
Moreover, an article on military doctrine indicated
the broad prerequisites governing Soviet guidelines: "The
limits for reasonable defensive sufficiency are determined
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by the need to prevent an unpunished attack under any
circumstances, even the most unfavorable...." (Kostev 1987,
3) It seems, as Gerhard Wettig points out, that Soviet
sufficiency is limited "only to the extent that [military
capabilities] provide for the destruction of the adversary
in the event of war." (1987, 4)
Thus, Gorbachev's sufficiency may only be political
rhetoric, perhaps aimed at palliating Western perceptions
of a Soviet threat and Warsaw Pact doubts over Soviet
intentions. Soviet calculations of sufficient defense may
still correlate to Grechko's instruction that
there can be no end to work to strengthen combat
readiness. Any results, even the best, must be regarded
as a base, as a trampoline, for achieving still higher
indicators. What is considered a success today may no
longer satisfy us tomorrow. (1973, 17)
The statement in 1987 by first deputy minister of
defense Lushev, guaranteeing the "victory of communism"
resulting from "the growing economic and defensive might of
the USSR" (13) , would seem to discount Western
interpretations of Soviet sufficiency.
Brezhnev's Tula remarks and Gorbachev's notion of
sufficiency may have the aim, not of introducing doctrinal
shifts, but of developing perceptions favorable to Soviet
arms control positions. The institutional limits imposed by
SALT II and the reductions attained in the INF Treaty and
the pending START treaty may achieve, in peacetime, the
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wartime objective of "eliminating or neutralizing" nuclear
weapons (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 291) .
The assumption that the Soviets deny the
possibility of winning a nuclear war may be fatally flawed.
An article in Voyennaya mysl
'
attributes to "bourgeois
theoreticians" (Bochkarev 1968, 2) what may be applicable
to Soviet rhetoric. According to the article, "[o]ne cannot
fail to see that the 'idea of the death civilization 1 and
nuclear war, in a certain regard is advantageous for the
same monopolistic bourgeoisie since it permits them to
camouflage their reactionary and aggressive aspirations."
(Bochkarev 1968, 2)
It may be more reasonable to assume that the
Soviets would rather accomplish their objectives through
peaceful means; should war occur, nuclear conflict would be
the least preferred method of combat but not excluded.
Recent Soviet sources have stated that "[t]he
assertion that nuclear war will not be a continuation of
politics is completely fallacious." (Gareyev 1985) A 1986
book review hinted at the possible debate within the Soviet
Union on how to "correlate the thesis that victory in a
nuclear missile war is impossible with the necessity of
increasing combat readiness of the army and navy so as to
be able to crush any aggressor." (Kaneyevskiy 1987, 31) It
is unclear whether Defense Minister Yazov ended the debate
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by declaring that "nuclear war cannot be a means for
attaining political goals." (1987, 4)
Yazov's declaration possibly meant that nuclear war
is a least favored alternative; for the Soviets to totally
discount the political utility of nuclear weapons seems
implausible. In the event of a war, the Soviets could be
expected, as described by Rand Soviet specialist Benjamin
Lambeth, to use "every resource available" to secure
victory (1985, 8).
Soviet writings have expressed doubts about the
controllability of nuclear war. Western assumptions as to
the feasibility of limited nuclear war are regularly
denounced by the Soviets. For example, Marshal Ogarkov has
commented on the impossibility "to hold nuclear war within
a certain restricted framework." (1982) Former Defense
Minister Ustinov stated that "all sober-minded people
realize fully well that a so-called local nuclear conflict
can always escalate into a world nuclear war." (1981, 21)
However, Ustinov may have qualified his statement
by using the word "can" instead of "will", possibly
indicating that escalation is not always inevitable. In
fact, according to former U.S. Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger, quoted from congressional testimony in 1974 in
an article by Graham Vernon, previous Soviet exercises have
indicated "notions of controlled nuclear war and
non-nuclear war. ... " (1979, 59)
33
Furthermore, Notra Trulock cites Voroshilov General
Staff Academy lecture materials from the mid-1970s that
discuss limited Soviet nuclear use in a war with NATO
(1987, 61-62). Trulock goes on to suggest that NATO's
flexible response strategy provides the Soviets the
opportunity to limit nuclear war below the intercontinental
level (1987, 78).
However, the Soviets may prefer to avoid the
uncertainty and questionable controllability of nuclear
war. It is important to the Soviets that war remain in
their control; a nuclear war may not provide the conditions
for maintaining such control, given the potential for
extensive damage and chaos.
As recognized by Gareyev, "the improvement and
stockpiling of nuclear missile weapons have reached such
limits where the massed employment of these weapons in a
war can entail catastrophic consequences for both sides."
(1985) As early as 1959, an article in Voyennaya mysl
'
observed "[i]f we destroy the enemy's troops, but in the
same step render our own armed forces lifeless, then we
shall hardly be able to impose our will on the enemy."
(Trifonenkov and Seleznov, 7)
According to another Soviet source
even if a modern aggressor estimates that he will be able
to save a certain portion of the population and national
wealth, the price of aggression comes too great and does
not justify those goals for which it is undertaken.
(Lomov, ed. 1973, 269)
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Moreover, a nuclear war would complicate and possibly
negate the maintenance of "firm and continuous strategic
leadership over the armed forces...." (Lomov, ed. 1973,
138)
Thus, with the attainment of parity, the Soviets
may have concluded that nuclear war, although still most
decisive, is potentially less practical for military and
political objectives. As revealed in a 1969 Voyennaya mysl
'
article,
the fatal consequences of the nuclear war is too heavy
for an aggressor to make an easy decision on the
immediate employment of nuclear weapons from the very
beginning of a war without having used all other means
for the attainment of its objectives. (Ivanov, 412)
Although never previously denying the possibility
of conventional operations, Soviet doctrine may have
strongly shifted in its preference for and confidence in a
conventional warfighting strategy. Gorbachev stresses the
need to "terminate the material preparations for a nuclear
war" (1986a, 4); his emphasis on alleviating preparations
for other types of wars is less defined.
Moreover, a 1987 article in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh
Sil claimed "there have been changes in the context of
Soviet military doctrine." The article proclaimed nuclear
war as "not appropriate to the real situation." Ostensibly
basing his judgments on the West's preparations to conduct
"extended conventional war," the article's author concluded
that the USSR "has to prepare an armed defense using not
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only nuclear weapons, but also highly effective
conventional means of destruction." (Kostev 1987,3)
A possible shift in Soviet military emphasis to
conventional war could affect Soviet objectives for
terminating a war. Specifically, a conventional warfighting
strategy may be inherently limited in its political and
geographic potential. Although conventional operations
could enhance Soviet capabilities to maintain control over
both the course of the war and the Warsaw Pact alliance, a
conventional war would likely be restricted to certain
theaters involving definite but limited objectives. A truly
global conventional war would probably not only extend the
duration of a war but also complicate the attainment of
broader geographical and political objectives. Chapter III
further discusses the question of nuclear and conventional
warfare, focusing primarily on the military-technical
merits as they relate to possible Soviet war termination
decisions.
3. Negotiation
The Soviets recognize, especially in a conventional
war, the possibility of protracted combat (Povaliy 1967,
70). As noted by Gareyev, "it is difficult to figure on a
rapid war between major coalitions with their enormous
potentials. ... it is essential to be ready for a protracted,
stubborn and fierce armed struggle." (1985) The book
Military Strategy indicated that the Soviets may plan for a
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war of at least one year, based on material requirements
(Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 28).
Should a protracted war occur, the likelihood of
negotiating a settlement may increase as military
operations stalemate. However, evidence of the
possibility of negotiating war termination in Soviet
writings is scarce.
Some Western analysts surmise that
the Soviets cannot even accept the concept of bargaining
for war termination because to do so would suggest,
first, that they would be willing to share responsibility
for the determination of their future and, second, that
once in a war they would be willing to settle for less
than fulfillment of their objectives. (Cimbala and
Douglass, eds. [1988], 333)
However, to deny the possibility of Soviet bargaining is to
assume unconditional and absolute Soviet objectives.
Though scarce, there is evidence the Soviets
acknowledge the role of negotiation in war termination.
Lenin is identified as describing, among the phenomena of
war, "peace terms dictated by the victors, which achieve
the stated aims." (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 35)
While "dictated" is hardly synonymous with "negotiated",
the imposition of peace terms implies the existence of a
political entity that is the object of the dictation.
The authors of Military Strategy discuss
negotiation, albeit from the alleged perspective of Western
theorists. Specifically discussed are tacit agreements on
the limits of military operations and the 'possibility of
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communicating and coordinating political aims with an
adversary prior to and at the outbreak of a war
( Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 65-66). On nuclear war, the Western
notion of conducting "negotiations for a peaceful
settlement" after a nuclear exchange is described
(Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 279). Whether the Soviets actually
accept what is ostensibly discussed as Western theory is
uncertain; however, the detailed account of limited war and
negotiation in Military Strategy could involve some mirror-
imaging of Soviet thinking on these subjects.
At best, Soviet writings offer only veiled evidence
of acceptance of intra-war negotiations. For example,
Ogarkov wrote in the Military Encyclopedia Dictionary
that "[d]iplomacy is inseparably linked with resolution of
the problems of war and peace." (1983c) Although vague,
Ogarkov' s statement does seem to indicate possible Soviet
recognition of the likelihood of negotiating settlements to
end specific wars.
Another Soviet source recognized that, in war, the
participants aim for victory; however, the war could end
"as a mutual compromise." (Lomov, ed. 1973, 226) Thus,
negotiation to end a war is strongly implied.
One must examine historical examples, such as the
1939-1940 Russo-Finnish war, to find clearer indications of
Soviet intra-war bargaining behavior. In this war, the USSR
sought mainly to establish a more secure buffer for the
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defense of Leningrad; this resulted in the acquisition of
approximately eleven percent of Finnish territory (Vigor
1983, 32).
Although the Soviets may have initially intended to
install a favorable government and were militarily poised
to do so, hints of a growing German threat seem to have
encouraged the limiting of objectives. Thus, the Soviets
negotiated a favorable but limited war settlement with the
existing Finnish government (Ulam 1974, 294).
It must be noted that while providing a historical
reference, this example is not necessarily indicative of
common Soviet practice; however, it is a relevant response
to an argument claiming that the Soviets are totally
unwilling to negotiate limited war termination conditions.
Afghanistan provides the most recent historical
example of Soviet wartime negotiating behavior. Since 1986,
the Soviets have modified their requirement for troop
withdrawal from a four year timetable to less than a year
(U.S. Department of State 1987, 11).
An apparent breakthrough was achieved on 8 February
1988 when Gorbachev agreed to a ten month schedule for the
withdrawal of Soviet troops beginning on 15 May but
contingent on a U.N. -sponsored settlement being reached by
the middle of March (Lee 1988, Al, A19). Furthermore,
Gorbachev's offer was reportedly made regardless of the
type of government eventually created in Afghanistan,
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thereby removing a previously complicating linkage (Lee
1988, A19).
It is unclear whether the Soviets are negotiating in
good faith to end the Afghan war. On 14 April 1988,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and the Soviet
Union did sign accords providing for the withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the restoration of
Afghanistan to nonaligned status (Lewis 1988, Al ) .
Assuming Soviet sincerity, the agreement would be evidence
of Soviet flexibility to adjust and limit war objectives
within emerging constraints.
However, too many possibilities exist for
duplicitous Soviet motivations. For example, the Soviet
invasion served to unite seven Islamic factions in a holy
war against the intruders; but as peace has drawn near,
division within the rebel ranks has increased, threatening
to erupt in violence once the common enemy is removed
(Weintraub 1988, A18).
Although the Soviets agreed to non-interference in
the internal affairs of Afghanistan (Lewis 1988, Al ) , it is
conceivable that an Afghan government, covertly supported
by the Soviet Union, could oversee the emasculation of the
resistance that Soviet troops were unable to achieve in
over eight years. Certainly, the presence of 10,000 Soviet
advisors currently within Afghanistan but not required by
the 14 April accord to be removed (Lewis 1988, A13) does
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not seem consistent with a promise of non-interference.
Moreover, the Soviets could exploit the tacit provision
that permits the U.S. and the USSR to aid their respective
allies should the other superpower engage in such activity
(Lewis 1988, Al )
.
Finally, the Soviet agreement to begin their troop
pullout by 15 May (Lewis 1988, Al ) could be a ploy to
derive propaganda points, in light of the May summit
meeting between President Reagan and Gorbachev and probable
Soviet hopes for a favorable START treaty.
Thus, it would be premature to make a case study of
Afghanistan to support judgments about Soviet intra-war
negotiating proclivities. The possibility may be
considerable, however, that the Soviets may be compelled to
engage in intra-war bargaining in a future conflict,
depending on the limitations and adjustments imposed on
their war objectives.
D. CONCLUSION
In reality, the most decisive aspect of Soviet military
strategy may be rhetoric. According to analysts Petersen
and Trulock, rhetoric ascribing decisive war objectives to
the USSR is intended to convince the West that notions of
limited war or limited objectives are unrealistic (1987,
17).
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Therefore, it is advantageous, in Soviet strategy, for
the West to believe that any nuclear use would quickly
escalate into a massive exchange; that any war, once begun,
must end in total, unconditional surrender; and that the
Soviets will employ nuclear weapons as warfighting assets,
especially if conventional weapons cannot secure the
objectives (Petersen and Trulock 1987, 17). Any admission
of limited objectives would deny the Soviets of the
political utility derived from the perceptions imposed on
the West.
However, rhetoric aside, Soviet objectives may be
contextually flexible and pragmatic. Although ultimate
political aims may entail the decisive, final defeat of all
opposition—capitalist or otherwise—the circumstances and
situation will affect the definition and achievement of
Soviet political aims in a given war.
In his discussion on war, Colonel Rybkin noted that,
having begun a war with specific goals, the opposing
sides often unexpectedly encounter a situation where they
set in motion previously disregarded forces, which may
have an effect on social processes even long before
victory or defeat. (1973a, 45)
Such social processes could involve, for example,
changes in the correlation of forces, a change of
government within members of opposing coalitions, or
domestic upheavals of varying degrees, including
revolution. The Soviets could be just as adversely affected
by such processes as could the West; therefore, the Soviets
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may be forced, depending on the circumstances, to alter
their objectives.
As an example, the moral-political foundation of the
Soviets could be their fatal flaw. As explained by the
authors of Military Strategy , the "[s]trategic leadership
cannot but consider the moral and political state of the
entire population of the country and of the armed forces,
when selecting one or another method of strategic action"
( Sokolovskiy , ed. 1968, 35); should this moral and
political state in the USSR or the Warsaw Pact be unstable,
Soviet actions may be constrained.
Petersen and Trulock believe there is a "flexibility
that allows the Soviets the ability to draw up short of
initial overall political objectives." (1987, 17) For
strategic, operational, and tactical scale military
actions, the Soviets define flexibility as "the ability to
assess a situation quickly and soberly, to catch the
essential and, in conformity with this , to follow through
with these decisions.... (emphasis added)" (Milovidov and
Kozlov, eds. 1972, 275) Presumably, the amount that
military strategy must flex would correspondingly affect
political aims.
Furthermore, the Soviets recognize the need for
"reasonableness and scientific substantiation" in
determining objectives and plans (Skirdo 1970, 86). Lack of
such reason results in a failure "to consider the true
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state of affairs, a tendency to ignore the correlation of
forces and one's own weakness, as well as underestimation
of difficulties." ( Skirdo 1970, 86) It is unlikely that the
Soviets would neglect such considerations.
The assumption that the Soviets would apply reason to
their pre-war calculations implies similar application and
modification during the war. As noted in one Soviet source,
"[s]tates drawn into a war are often compelled to
reappraise some aspects of their policies, to adapt them to
the new tasks emerging in the course of the armed
struggle." (Byely and others 1972, 20) Similarly, a more
recent Soviet book recognized the need for policy "to make
adjustments, to change the goals and to pose new tasks"
should "the course of military operations [develop] in a
way not consistent with the plan." (Volkogonov, ed. 1984)
Military capabilities could figure greatly in Soviet
objectives; as discussed earlier, military power entails
inherent restrictions on the feasibility of attaining
political objectives. According to Ogarkov,
[t]he political objectives of the war must fully
correspond to the military potential of the state, the
military capabilities of the armed forces and the methods
of conducting military operations which they are using.
The latter must reliably ensure the achievement of the
established objectives. (1985)
Failure of the military to obtain objectives, possibly
because the objectives are too ambitious or inflexible,
could be detrimental to the overall war effort. As the
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Soviets have noted, "strategic failures can tell very
substantially on the course and even the outcome of the
war." (Lomov, ed. 1973, 238) Moreover, military success or
failure will affect morale which, according to the Soviets,
"determines the nature of strategic plans in general...."
(Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 36)
Thus, contrary to common declaratory posture, the
Soviets may accept the requirement of flexible and limited
objectives, imposed by the uncertainty of war. The course
of war is subject to change as are the politics that
determine the war's objectives. Victory, as defined by the
Soviets, may be a hybrid of the political aims developed
prior to the war and the adjustments in those aims
occurring as a result of war.
The ultimate Soviet political objective of the global
victory of communism is probably immutable as long as the
USSR and the ruling Politburo exist. A peaceful resolution
to the communist-capitalist competition, despite the
inherently lengthy duration of such a conflict, is probably
preferable to the Soviets. War would be more difficult to
direct and control; the potential for error would be great
and the consequences could be fatal.
Even if the Soviets accept that a future war cannot and
will not necessarily achieve the victory of communism, this
ultimate objective is not denied. Although it is
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acknowledged that temporary setbacks are possible, victory
is still held to be inevitable (Kozlov, ed. 1971, 40).
In conclusion, war is not required to achieve the final
Soviet victory; should a war occur, however, the Soviets
likely expect the outcome will advance their progress
toward final victory. However, to pursue unconditional
objectives could perpetrate the fatal mistake of extending
politics beyond capabilities. Hence, Soviet war termination
objectives in a future war are likely to be limited;
victory may be defined as an outcome that contributes to
the ultimate political objective.
In the following chapter, limited Soviet objectives for
terminating a war in Europe and the potential contribution
of these objectives toward the ultimate victory of
communism are discussed.
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III. SOVIET LIMITED OBJECTIVES FOR WAR
TERMINATION IN EUROPE
A. INTRODUCTION
Although the Soviets no longer claim that war is
inevitable, they state that, should a war occur, it will be
a "decisive armed conflict between two diametrically
opposed social systems—capitalism and socialism." (Ogarkov
1982) Europe is a likely major battlefield for such a clash
and it is probable that the Soviet Union has given
consideration, not only to how such a war might be fought,
but to the conditions required for concluding military
conflict.
Strategic analyst Colin Gray asserts that the USSR may
deem a rapid defeat of NATO as decisive in altering the
correlation of forces and inducing the United States to
seek a termination of hostilities. Gray states:
the Soviet Union has every reason to attempt to take the
resources base and strategic geography of Western Europe
out of the American 'column' as early as possible and in
the process inflict, hopefully, crippling losses on
American general-purpose forces. (Gray 1986, 88)
However, the defeat and removal of NATO from the U.S.
force ledger may not require victory in the sense of
complete destruction of the adversaries' political,
economic, and military foundations. The Soviet Union may
want to terminate a war in Europe with complete hegemony
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realized; it may settle, though, for the political and
military dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of U.S.
military power from the continent as sufficient for ending
a European war. In short, to defeat NATO may entail only
its neutralization, thereby leaving Western Europe
vulnerable to Soviet coercion and blackmail.
Although seemingly contrary to the decisive conflict
predicted by Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology, the premise
of limited Soviet objectives for terminating a war in
Europe does not preclude the eventual fulfillment of the
Communist requirement, as explained in the previous
chapter.
Termination need not require total occupation or
replacement of all Western European governments with
Soviet-sponsored regimes; hegemonic Soviet control and
revolutionary change could, however, be a process
accelerated by the post-war conditions. As noted by the
Soviets, " [p]olicy utilizes the results of a war that has
been concluded." (Volkogonov, ed. 1984)
Therefore, Soviet objectives in a war with NATO are
assumed to be the defeat of the alliance and the removal of
American power from Europe. This may be a prerequisite in a
larger struggle between free societies and the USSR;
conservation of resources in the preliminary battle may
enhance Soviet readiness in the greater conflict.
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This chapter presents a case for limited Soviet
objectives for terminating a war with NATO. Soviet
war-fighting and war-related strategies and tactics
pertaining to the dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of
U.S. influence from Europe are discussed; thoughts on how a
war may end should not be isolated from reflections on how
a war may be fought.
B. LIMITED VICTORY IN EUROPE
The idea that Soviet objectives may stop short of total
victory requires further explanation. Christopher Donnelly
claims that the Soviets require, in a short time, "the
total political collapse of the key NATO governments, or
the physical destruction or neutralization of the machinery
of national and international politics...." (1980, 35)
Based on his belief that "total victories are the product
of total ideologies" (1983, 30-31), Peter Vigor states that
"Soviet victory in a total war. . .would inevitably mean the
total destruction of Western liberal democracies" because
"a war can only really be ended by completely resolving the
policy clash that engendered it" and by precluding the
defeated country or countries from seeking revenge. (1983,
44-46)
The above assertions are not disputed; rather, they are
believed essential in the overall ideological struggle but,
as previously mentioned, not all are necessarily within
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immediate military objectives. For example, it is possible
that, in a war, an organization sympathetic to the Soviet
Union may ascend to power in a NATO member with enough
popular support to facilitate that country's withdrawal
from the Western Alliance; with enough such defections,
NATO could be effectively neutralized. Furthermore, the
Soviets could facilitate the replacement of existing
governments through violent subversion or overt military
takeover.
The distinction of limitation is that coups in all
Western European governments would not necessarily be
required to terminate the war. Hence, in a war against
NATO, Soviet war-fighting strategy may be designed to
defeat the alliance short of complete political and
military destruction.
Analysts Phillip Petersen and Notra Trulock suggest
that Soviet declaratory policies coupled with operational
pragmatism result in military strategy being "focused on
the perceived political vulnerabilities of NATO as much as
it is focused on perceived military vulnerabilities."
(1987, 17) Thus, military efforts could be concentrated on
political weaknesses within the Western alliance.
Evidence is available in Soviet writings that suggests
thoughts of defeating NATO by exploiting political
vulnerabilities. For example, according to Military
Strategy , a strategy for victory "can arise only from
50
politics strengthened by a unity of purpose on the part of
the coalition members, which is very difficult to achieve
in coalitions of predatory imperialist countries."
(Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 22) Implied is a Soviet realization
of the utility in disrupting NATO's unity of purpose.
Furthermore, Gareyev, in his book M. V. Frunze-Military
Theorist , writes of the need to "determine what enemies
must be defeated in what sequence." (1985) In a war with
NATO, this could translate into a Soviet effort against
weak or vulnerable members, the removal of which would
destroy—or at least degrade—the alliance's military
efficacy.
In sum, it is possible that Soviet war plans include
limited contingencies to defeat NATO short of political and
military obliteration. War termination may depend on the
imposition of political disintegration and military
impotence upon NATO.
1. Wartime Strategy
According to Rand analyst John Van Oudenaren,
Soviet peacetime strategies are designed to facilitate the
dissolution of the NATO alliance to as great a degree as
possible (1986, 4) ; wartime strategies are a violent
extension of this objective.
Depending on the evaluation of the pre-war
political-military situation, the Soviets are likely to
pursue "the withdrawal from the war of one or several
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countries of the unfriendly aggressor bloc"; "the
disorganization of the enemy's deep rear area"; and "the
destruction of [the enemy's] strategic groups of armed
forces...." (Kruchinin 1963, 12)
It may be hypothesized that such goals would be
directed toward the dissolution of NATO and the decoupling
of U.S. military power from Europe; in other words, the
neutralization of NATO rather than its unconditional
defeat. Efforts toward the attainment of limited Soviet
objectives for terminating a war in Europe will likely be
pursued concurrently and thus overlap. Furthermore, the
Soviets expound the "need to decisively defeat the
aggressor in the shortest possible time" (Sokolovskiy, ed.
1968, 202); therefore, the Soviets may aim for a rapid
victory in Europe. The following sections will discuss
aspects of Soviet wartime strategy and related implications
for terminating a war upon the attainment of limited
objectives.
C. WARTIME DIPLOMACY
Just as Soviet peacetime diplomacy seeks to weaken NATO
cohesion (Van Oudenaren 1986, 4) , wartime diplomacy is a
low risk, high yield venture likely to be conducted
throughout the duration of a conflict with the intention of
destroying NATO cohesion. Upon forcing the dissolution of
NATO, the USSR might have secured one of its most critical
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limited war termination objectives. As stated in Military
Strategy
, the "diplomatic and economic struggle does not
stop in wartime." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 20) Moreover,
wartime diplomacy is recognized as being capable of
influencing "the course and even the character of military
operations." (Dmitriyev 1971, 58)
Gareyev further elaborates that the Soviets must
"carefully follow and correctly assess the military-
political forces" and "skillfully play upon the
contradictions between the bourgeois countries and their
internal contradictions." (1985) Diplomacy will be
essential for such assessment and necessary for the
manipulation of vulnerable members of NATO.
According to the Soviets, effective diplomatic efforts
can contribute to "strategic success" by securing the
"withdrawal of individual states of the enemy coalition
from the war." (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary 1986 ,
80-81) For example, according to Soviet sources, included
in the Soviet diplomatic activities during World War II
were the establishing of an anti-fascist popular front, the
sabotaging of enemy diplomatic efforts, the acquiring of
new allies or the neutralizing of potential enemies, and,
perhaps most crucial, the splitting of the enemy coalition
via the signing of separate peace treaties (Dmitriyev 1971,
57-58) .
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Coercion in wartime assumes an overt and violent
nature. In developing war termination objectives, it is
essential to complement coercion with what Fred Ikle terms
"political inducements" (1971, 46) ; wartime diplomacy may
provide the vehicle for communicating these inducements. *
Throughout the course of a war, opportunities will
arise for the timely proposal of political inducements. As
noted in the Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary .
"[t]he internal political affairs of belligerent nations
and international relations undergo significant changes,
depending on the course taken by a war." (Ogarkov, ed.
1983b) Furthermore, the Soviets recognize that:
the composition of the opposing coalition will depend
largely upon our successes and how the strategic
situation will develop. In the event of our decisive
successes, certain countries can pull out of this
coalition. . . . (Gareyev 1985)
The fortunes of war need not portend imminent doom for
a country to reconsider its alliance obligations. As stated
by Fred Ikle, "giving up after the army has been beaten is
almost invariably worse for the nation." (1971, 52) Yet,
for the Soviets to convince a NATO ally to forsake its
commitments prior to the outcome of the war may be
commensurate to a military defeat as far as the overall
*See Appendix, section C. , 4., d. for discussion on
the difficulties of communicating and conducting diplomacy
during war.
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efficacy of the alliance or, for that matter, the
withdrawing government is concerned (Ikle 1971, 102)
.
Therefore, Soviet wartime diplomacy can potentially reduce
the costs of a war being fought for limited objectives.
The Soviets may attempt to impose conditions on Europe
that supplement wartime diplomatic efforts. This may be
accomplished in several ways, the conduct of which may,
again, be overlapping and complementary.
1 . Political Contacts
The Soviets may attempt to exploit the inroads laid
by a peacetime campaign to secure Western political
contacts and, thus, create a political infrastructure with
the potential to ascend to power, replacing an existing
NATO government with a regime controlled by or sympathetic
to the USSR. Many peacetime political contacts are secured
and supported via an extensive Soviet network of
diplomatic and intelligence agents (U.S. Congress. Senate.
1986, 5-6)
.
Specific targets of peacetime recruitment and
wartime utilization are likely to include political
parties, key government personnel, peace organizations,
unions, and, possibly, terrorist organizations. According
to Boris Ponomarev, former head of the Soviet's
International Department, such contacts would establish
"broad alliances covering the majority of the people and
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capable of achieving major social changes," whose "final
objective would be socialism." (1977, 40)
Political and governmental contacts may provide the
Soviets their most beneficial avenue for undermining
Western governments during a war. According to Robert
Gates, an official in the CIA, "Moscow's ultimate objective
is to develop agents of influence at the highest levels of
foreign governments." (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1986, 23)
Cases such as Norway's "Treholt affair"* highlight
a Soviet ability to secure positions in Western
governments, the true extent of which may be unknown. This
ability suggests the USSR's potential to undermine these
governments from within during war. With favorable forces
in power, separate peace treaties that could undermine the
political and military viability of NATO would be more
easily attainable, thereby promoting Soviet objectives for
war termination.
It is possible that the course of the war may
itself generate a change in an opposing government. As Fred
Ikle notes, "the impact of the new appreciation of how the
war is going and what it costs may strike the spark for a
change in leadership." (1971, 37)
*See Van Oudenaren 1986, 105.
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2 . Political Coups
Should the war effort fall short of inducing
desired change, the Soviet Union may assume the initiative.
Historically, the Soviets have shown no remorse in the
removal and replacement of governments unsupportive of
Moscow's interests. For example, in 1956, while the Soviet
ambassador to Hungary, Yuri Andropov, was assuring the
Hungarian leader Imre Nagy of the security of his regime,
Red Army tanks were approaching the Hungarian Parliament to
force an end to Nagy's government (Charlton 1984, 126).
The preferred Soviet method of negotiation, some
Western analysts have observed, is to "destroy the existing
leadership, insert a new pro-Soviet leadership, recognize
the new leadership, and negotiate with that new
leadership." (Cimbala and Douglass, eds. [1988], 332) For
example, although the circumstances characterizing Soviet
objectives and operations in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan
are not wholly analogous to a similar scenario applied to a
NATO country, the model is operationally informative and
historically relevant.
Both in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the Soviets
fostered ties with rival factions that the Soviets would
assist in gaining political control. Once in power, these
factions would formally align themselves with the Soviet
Union. Thus, in both cases, the Soviet strategy was to
complement a military invasion with a political coup in a
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minimal amount of time to preclude an organized response.
(Valenta 1984, 230-232)
In Czechoslovakia, for example, the government of
Alexander Dubcek and other potential leaders of a Czech
resistance were arrested within one to two hours of the
start of the 1968 invasion (Vigor 1983, 136). However, in
this example, the pro-Soviet factions failed to take power
and Dubcek, under tighter control, was reinstated until
Moscow gradually effected permanent political change
(Valenta 1984, 232). The objectives of strict Soviet
political control were ultimately met; the military
invasion merely created the conditions necessary to secure
the objectives.
On the other hand, rapid and violent political
change supplemented the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The
invasion began in large scale on December 24, 1979; on
December 27, KGB and Spetsnaz forces attacked and killed
President Amin (Kohler 1987, 47). It was then announced
that Babrak Karmal, the Soviets 1 puppet of choice, had led
the overthrow and was now asking for Soviet assistance,
after the invasion had been initiated (Ulam 1983, 255).
One might surmise the possibility of similar coup
attempts against NATO governments in order to secure war
termination objectives through a separate peace with a pro-
Soviet regime. According to Victor Suvorov, the role of KGB
and Spetsnaz forces in the Afghanistan coup was not an
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anomaly; in war, both organizations are tasked with
" [h]unting down and assassinating the enemy's political and
military leaders." (1983, 1210) Former Czechoslovakian
government official Jan Sejna describes how, in 1964, the
KGB developed a list of hundreds of names of British
political, industrial, military, and security personnel
designated for imprisonment and execution to prevent their
opposition to a "progressive [read pro-Soviet] government."
(1982, 144)
3. The Public Battle
Complementing Soviet diplomatic and military
strategy to secure withdrawals from NATO may be a wartime
campaign to enlist the assistance of Western publics in the
diplomatic struggle. As recognized by Michael Handel: "In
peace negotiations, public opinion can play a significant
role." (1978, 63)
Soviet literature places significant emphasis on
the role of the public in time of war. The book Military
Strategy notes that in modern war, "the attitude of the
mass populace toward the war will unavoidably have a
decisive effect on its final outcome." (Sokolovskiy, ed.
1968, 210) Further, Gareyev writes, "the rear supplies the
front not only with material but also ideas and moods."
(1985) This may indicate that the Soviets perceive the
battle to control public opinion crucial to the war effort;
a Western public lacking the conviction and fortitude to
59
suffer through a war could force the withdrawal of one or
more NATO countries.
In the opinion of analyst C.J. Dick, the Soviets do
question the fiber of the Western publics:
The Soviets would doubt whether Western Europeans would
have the unity and determination, the hardihood and lack
of concern for their own lives (and that of their
families) that characterize the Afghans, and which are
necessary for a protracted and apparently hopeless
struggle. (1986, 19)
Similarly, the Soviets remark on alleged citations by U.S.
authors that conclude "that the Western countries would be
unable to endure the horrors of the atomic chaos." (Byely
and others 1972, 246)
The Soviet Union would probably expect an inverse
relationship between its anticipated rising fortunes in a
war and the lowering of Western morale. As written in
Military Strategy . "military successes or defeats
decisively affect the morale of the army and the people."
(Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 36)
Hence, it is likely that Soviet diplomatic and
political efforts will attempt to enlist NATO public
support to encourage their respective governments to
withdraw from the war. However, part of such a Soviet
strategy may aim toward destroying public morale, thus
laying it prone to capitulation.
In terms of the salience of the public battle in
Soviet strategy, it may be more than just an historical
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anecdote that Gareyev communicated when he wrote: "In World
War I, Germany surrendered because of the economic and
moral-political collapse of the nation's rear without still
having suffered a complete defeat on the battlefield."
(1985)
Although wartime diplomacy would likely play a
significant role in the overall Soviet war-fighting
strategy, diplomacy is primarily deemed capable of "dealing
'auxiliary blows'". (Dmitriyev 1971, 57) According to the
Soviets, the ultimate realization of objectives requires
military successes (Dmitriyev 1971, 57-58)
.
D. WAR-FIGHTING
Another method of imposing conditions that supplement
wartime diplomacy is, of course, war-fighting. In order to
secure the withdrawal of nations from NATO, the Soviets may
aim to convince target countries that victory is
unattainable, thereby facilitating the imposition of
termination conditions upon them.
Most of what has previously been discussed in this
thesis has described the socio-political aspect of Soviet
military doctrine. Much of the subsequent discussion in
this chapter will focus on the military-technical aspect,
concerned with the specifics of the war and how it might be
conducted to attain Soviet objectives for terminating a war
in Europe (Byely and others 1972, 6).
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1. The Nuclear Question
When discussing Soviet war-fighting strategy, it is
necessary to consider the role assumed for nuclear weapons.
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is significant
debate over whether the Soviets would use nuclear weapons
in a hypothetical large-scale East-West war in Europe.
Books such as Military Strategy (1968) and The Offensive
(197 0) are heavily slanted toward nuclear strategy.
However, analysts point to more recent authoritative
writings, such as Gareyev's book, that can be interpreted
as questioning previous concepts of military art:
A profound and generally correct analysis of the
development prospects of the theory of military strategy
considering the appearance of nuclear missile weapons has
been provided in the book Voyennaya strategiya [ Military
Strategy 1 edited by MSU V. D. Sokolovskiy. However, over
the more than 20 years not all the provisions of this
book have been confirmed. (1985)
Whether nuclear weapons remain the primary Soviet
war-fighting instrument, a limited use weapon, or a dormant
deterrent that encourages the limitation of war to
conventional operations is uncertain. The Soviets have
stated that "a world war can begin, and be waged for a
certain time, with the use of only conventional weapons"
but that "the expansion of military operations can lead to
its escalation into a general use nuclear war...." ( Soviet
Military Encyclopedia 1979, 93)
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Though the Soviets have noted that "for one of the
sides, which has achieved the necessary results and is
successfully developing the offensive, it will be
advantageous to delay the beginning of the use of nuclear
weapons as long as possible," they recognize that possible
nuclear use by the opponent could result in mutual nuclear
exchanges (Samorukov 1967, 261-262). Soviet analyses of
NATO exercises may have concluded that the West would
resort to nuclear use as early as four to five days into a
war (Samorukov 1967, 263); the Soviets would presumably
attempt to anticipate and preempt such use.
The Soviets could, as argued by Notra Trulock,
elect to conduct only limited nuclear strikes, "tightly
controlled by the political leadership and based firmly on
considerations of military effectiveness...." (1987, 55)
Similarly, Albert Wohlstetter, based on his analysis of
Soviet military writings and lecture materials from the
Voroshilov General Staff Academy, envisions possible Soviet
nuclear use on the NATO flanks, perhaps "to divide allies
and to give some the incentive and opportunity to opt out."
(1985, 983) William Scott notes that Soviet military
writings since the early 1980s stress tactical nuclear use
(1984, 70)
.
However, as discussed in the previous chapter,
should war occur, nuclear conflict may be the least
preferred war-fighting option. The Soviet need to maintain
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political and military control and the intention to keep
vital European objectives intact would likely be
complicated by nuclear war (Wohlstetter 1985, 983-985)
.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Soviet
emphasis on maintaining control in a conflict may be the
most compelling argument against using nuclear weapons even
in a most limited manner, given the uncertainties in
conducting nuclear war. Arms control initiatives, such as
the INF Treaty, and public statements seem to reinforce the
argument that maintaining control over both the course of
the war and the Warsaw Pact alliance are Soviet
imperatives.
For example, in 1981, Leonid Brezhnev described
weapons of mass destruction to the 2 6th Party Congress as
"exceptionally difficult, if not impossible" to control
(22) . Similarly, Gorbachev reported to the Central
Committee of the CPSU and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in
1987 that weapons are becoming "uncontrollable." (1987a,
24)
Conventional war may seem inherently more
controllable and therefore more practical to the Soviets.
The Soviets claim that a single counter- force nuclear
strike cannot succeed in destroying the opponent's nuclear
weapons (Ogarkov 1984, 90); however, a conventional war,
fought with advanced conventional weapons, may succeed in
attaining more limited objectives.
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Marshal Ogarkov explains that while the socio-
political aspect of Soviet military doctrine is stable and
largely enduring, the military-technical aspect "is more
changeable, for it depends decisively on the means and
methods of waging armed conflict, which are constantly
changing and improving." (1985) Included in Ogarkov's
changing aspect of Soviet military doctrine is "the
significant qualitative improvement of conventional means
and methods of armed conflict." (1985)
Ogarkov also discusses "the rapid quantitative
increase in nuclear weapons" and associated qualitative
improvements that have
led to a fundamental reexamination of the role of these
weapons and to overturning former views on their place
and significance in war; on the methods of waging battles
and operations; and even on the overall possibility of
conducting war with the use of nuclear weapons. (1985)
In contrast to the historically earlier Soviet declaratory
emphasis on inevitable nuclear use, this more recent
statement by Ogarkov may signal a Soviet de-emphasis of
nuclear warfare, possibly in favor of conventional warfare,
given the emerging improvements in conventional weapons and
nuclear defenses.
Other recent statements may further indicate a
growing emphasis on conventional warfare, characterized by
advanced technology but nevertheless non-nuclear in nature.
For example, in 1987, first deputy minister of defense
General Lushev wrote of "the changes in military affairs,
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to the carrying out of combat under conditions where the
aggressor employs high-precision weapons" (6) . Although
Lushev was describing an aggressor, it is unlikely the
Soviets neglect such possibilities for their own forces.
The meaning and intent of Soviet writings and
statements are open to debate; a shift to a conventional
war-fighting emphasis is possible. Moreover, one analyst
suggests that Soviet joint exercises in Europe since the
Dnieper exercise in 1967 have "generally reflected, to an
appreciable extent, the desire to prepare for a war in
Europe that could be fought extensively, if not
exclusively, with conventional arms." (Caravelli 1983, 401)
Most likely, as Petersen and Trulock have surmised
from their study of Soviet military doctrine since 1964,
the Soviets "prepare to fight with conventional means under
the constant threat of the enemy's use of nuclear weapons."
(1987, 11) Thus, the Soviets may prefer, for purposes of
control (even to the extent of limiting their objectives)
to contain fighting to the conventional level but they do
not rule out the possibility of engaging in combined arms
operations that include nuclear weapons to achieve victory
(Byely and others 1972, 253).
A conventional warfighting strategy may be
inherently limited in its political and geographic
potential. However, a conventional war may be perceived by
the Soviets as facilitating greater control over the course
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of the war as well as a more effective means of securing
and maintaining their objectives, albeit limited, for
terminating a war in Europe. Furthermore, the Soviet Union
may expect that its potential for escalation dominance, or
the capability to dominate any phase of military conflict
(conventional, tactical nuclear, strategic nuclear, or
chemical/biological) may preclude Western nuclear use in a
war with the Warsaw Pact.
2 . Escalation Dominance
Arguments claiming a Soviet capability to dominate
escalation center on the shift in the nuclear weapons
balance, the improved "lethality and force mobility" of
Soviet conventional weapons, the lack of NATO "operational
depth and large reserves reguired to counter major Warsaw
Pact penetration early in the war", and the decreasing
cohesion within the Western alliance (Hines and Petersen
1983a, 702)
.
Analysts suggest that Soviet conventional forces
alone are capable of holding NATO's nuclear weapons at risk
(Nerlich 1980, 114) . Historical concessions of Warsaw Pact
quantitative superiority may have evolved into a compromise
of NATO qualitative superiority as well (Schemmer 1984,
80) .
As an example, military analyst Phillip Karber
asserts that the development and deployment of reactive
armor on Soviet tanks "nullifies a decade of NATO
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investment in infantry antitank weapons...." (Schemmer
1987, 43)
The former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe,
General Rogers, stated that, overall,
Although Allied Command Europe gets stronger
conventionally every year, the gap between the force
capability of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact gets
wider each year, decreasing the credibility of our
deterrent. (1984, 2)
Based on the conclusions of a NATO Military
Committee report, a 1985 article in the Armed Forces
Journal International asserted that within 15 years "a
[Warsaw] Pact [conventional] blitzkrieg could overwhelm
NATO before it could even resort to the nuclear option...."
(Schemmer 1985, 64)
NATO theater nuclear forces are outnumbered, and
some may be self-deterring. The ranges of NATO's
battlefield and short-range intermediate nuclear forces
(SRINF) , combined with the expected speed of a Soviet
offensive and the probable delay in nuclear release
authority, may either preclude use or force use on NATO
territory. This choice could result in non-use. Further
complicating the situation is the ability of the Soviets to
conduct a SRINF exchange in Europe while their homeland
remains out of range. (Nerlich 1980, 115)
Medium and long range INF weapons can hold Soviet
territory at risk; however, these are also outnumbered and
have been negotiated away in the December 1987 INF Treaty,
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thus further diminishing the NATO deterrent. It had been
suggested that American INF missiles in Europe "serve as
links to United States intercontinental systems and
demonstrate to the USSR that it could not hope to limit a
war to Europe." (Yost 1987, 73)
This continental linkage being removed, and
potential Soviet escalation dominance has placed the
intercontinental deterrent in question. Many in Europe
doubt the existence of an American 'nuclear umbrella' as
well as the logic behind any nuclear employment, much less
the initiating use. American strategic forces are
vulnerable to Soviet attack and, thus, have lost "strategic
flexibility." (Nerlich 1980, 116)
Henry Kissinger plainly described what many in NATO
feared when he stated:
the European allies should not keep asking us to multiply
strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or if
we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we
execute, we risk the destruction of civilization. (1979,
266)
Even if NATO maintains its intention to initiate
use of nuclear weapons to repel a Warsaw Pact invasion, the
Soviets could possibly exploit Western notions of limiting
war by engaging in solely conventional operations. In
other words, apparent Soviet nuclear superiority, coupled
with declared and operational restraint, may be enough to
maintain conventional levels of fighting long enough to
militarily defeat or politically dissolve NATO.
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NATO appears to be in a position where the current
military balance on the conventional and nuclear levels
negates the efficacy of its flexible response doctrine;
some would argue that the alliance can neither credibly
threaten to punish Soviet aggression nor effectively deny
Soviet objectives on the various escalatory levels (Legge
1983, 41). From this viewpoint, NATO's escalatory options
may be foreclosed.
According to Fred Ikle, "in an acute crisis, when
nuclear destruction turns from an abstract fear into a
concrete vision of terror, ... reliance on nuclear arms may
make NATO governments afraid of their own military
capability." (1980, 20) Petersen and Trulock provide an
excerpt from the Voroshilov Staff Academy lectures that
suggests that the Soviets long ago recognized this
possibility:
the danger of massive strikes by all nuclear weapons in
retaliation for any attempt at the use of nuclear
weapons, be it of a limited nature, may force the [NATO]
countries to give up the continuation of combat actions.
(Petersen and Trulock 1987, 14)
Furthermore, as discussed in the conclusion of the previous
chapter, Soviet rhetoric would probably attempt to promote
such apocalyptic Western fears.
Realizing their potential for escalation dominance,
the Soviets may recognize NATO's disincentives to employ
nuclear weapons and, thus, structure war-fighting
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strategies accordingly. For example, the Soviets could,
through deep penetrations of NATO nations, further
complicate nuclear use against the advancing military
forces (Hines and Petersen 1983a, 702)
.
With NATO outflanked on a tactical level and
intercontinental forces stalemated on the strategic level,
the USSR may be free to exploit its conventional force
preponderance. As stated by Hines, Petersen, and Trulock,
the neutralization of NATO's nuclear deterrent "should
serve to force the conduct of warfare down to the
conventional level where victory could be both more
attainable and meaningful." (1986, 18)
At this point, wartime diplomacy may reap its
greatest harvest. NATO would be reduced to a dysfunctional
military alliance ripe for dissolution through separate and
conditional peace agreements. A wartime variant of the
Soviet diplomatic dual-track employed during the anti-INF
campaign might be offered. During the 1979-1983 anti-INF
campaign, the Soviets combined nuclear threats with offers
to spare those countries not deploying U.S. missiles (Ruehl
1983, 23); during war, those same nuclear threats might
accompany offers to spare those countries suing for peace.
The contacts forged during peacetime will likely
accelerate their efforts to promote Soviet war termination
objectives. Even without such Soviet manipulation, Ikle
suggests, "[e]normous pressure would be mobilized and
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brought to bear on government leaders—through parliaments,
the media and other channels—to avoid at almost any price
the risk of large-scale nuclear war." (1980, 20)
Statistical evidence lends credibility to Ikle's
statement. In a 1983 Harris poll, significant percentages
of Europeans surveyed indicated that the use of nuclear
weapons would not be acceptable under any circumstances,
even if their respective country was attacked with such
weapons. Greece, Norway, Italy, and the Netherlands
registered among the highest percentages: 51, 48, 47, and
42, respectively. Lesser portions were registered by West
Germany, France, and Great Britain at 31, 27, and 24
percent, respectively. Although only Greece scored above 50
percent, the peacetime numbers may only be percentages of a
larger cry for peace at any price to be heard during war.
(De Boer 1985, 125)
Discussion of Soviet escalation dominance would be
incomplete without mention of biological and chemical
warfare capabilities (BW/CW) . In-depth discussion of these
aspects of military power is beyond the intent of this
thesis. However, it must be noted that, in chemical
warfare, Soviet offensive preponderance and NATO's
defensive neglect leads to the presumption that such
weapons could be effectively employed, at least in a
limited manner, in a major conflict in Europe (U.S. DIA
1985, 1) Estimates of Soviet chemical stockpiles range from
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20-50 times greater than that maintained by the U.S.
(Levinson 1986, 732).
In biological warfare, the Defense Intelligence
Agency has concluded that, not only are the Soviets
developing and producing BW agents, they are "continuing to
test and evaluate delivery and dissemination systems for
these agents." (U.S. DIA 1986, 1)
Although the Soviets may have been acknowledging
their assessment of the potential utility of future CW/BW
use in noting that "[t]he experience of past wars teaches
us that sudden use of new resources of armed conflict has
an intense moral-psychological influence upon the enemy"
(Volkogonov, ed. 1984) , such use may be delayed in a war.
Rather than instigating a counterproductive Western
retaliation to the use of CW/BW weapons, the Soviets may
prefer to exploit their preponderant advantage through
threats aimed at convincing various NATO nations of the
utility of conditional peace settlements. Thus, the Soviets
might attempt to exploit various aspects of an ability to
dominate escalation to attain their objectives for war
termination.
3 . The Initial Period of War
Soviet conventional, nuclear, and CW/BW
capabilities can arguably claim to have achieved escalation
dominance over NATO. Skillful military use of the
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considerable Soviet force potential would obviously enhance
prospects for favorable war termination.
Fred Ikle suggests that the outcome of a single
battle could bring about the termination of a war "if the
leadership on the losing side does not want to make its
forces fight on till they are all destroyed...." (1971, 37)
He further points out, "when escalation—or the threat of
it—has succeeded in reversing the enemy's determination to
fight on, it has consisted of an extraordinarily powerful
move." (Ikle 1971, 55)
It is likely that the battle and escalation Ikle
refers to would occur in the initial phase of Soviet
attack. For example, the Soviets discuss their intent to
attain "victory over the aggressor first of all within the
shortest possible time...." (Sokolovskiy , ed. 1968, 211)
Moreover, based on their study of WWII, the Soviets have
recognized "the increased importance ... of initial
operations for the course and even the outcome of a war."
(Ivanov 1974, 303)
It is possible, as suggested by Nathan Leites, that
initial Soviet operations would strike a main blow that may
be both militarily and politically motivated (1982, 303).
The Soviets have discussed a concept called "power
pressure", defined as a "show of force. .. aimed at
influencing the psychological state of the decision-maker
and forming in his mind the primary objective of avoiding
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combat." (Ionov 1971, 603) It may be that although the
initial attack compels the targeted decision-makers to
engage in military defense, they may quickly be convinced
to avoid further hostilities.
To this end, the powerful character and direction
of the initial attack may be a logical complement to Soviet
pre-war political and diplomatic efforts, the decisive
impact of which "either helped the enemy's peace faction to
dislodge leaders who were committed to fight on, or it
caused a sudden change of mind in the enemy leadership."
(Ikle 1971, 55-56) According to Soviet sources, assessment
of the political situation would result in:
acceptable prognoses on the capability of the state or
coalition of states, located in the theater of military
operation, to continue the war when certain areas are
knocked out of action or captured. (Shirokov 1966, 200)
One conceivable Soviet prognosis of the military
and political vulnerability of NATO suggests an attack in
the Western TVD with the primary strategic direction aimed
The Soviet concept of the TVD (teatr voyennykh
deystviy) organizes regions of war based on military,
political, and economic considerations that determine not
only the territory involved but the overall importance of
the related objective. Strategic directions occur within
TVDs. The three European TVD's are the Northwestern,
Southwestern, and Western, with the latter including
Denmark, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg, France, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal,
Switzerland, Ireland, northern Morocco, western Algeria,
Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, the southern part of
the Baltic Sea, and the western part of the Mediterranean
Sea. (See Hines and Petersen 1986, 282-284) .
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at Denmark. According to analysts Christopher Donnelly and
Phillip Petersen, Denmark "constitutes the principal focus
for Soviet hopes to unravel the NATO coalition quickly."
(1986, 1047) They surmise that if the Soviets could succeed
in quickly neutralizing Denmark, other small countries
would voluntarily follow; thus, NATO's geo-political and
military situation would be severely damaged, if not
decisively so (Donnelly and Petersen 1986, 1047)
.
Assisting such a Soviet strategy may be NATO's
military organization. NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG)
is tasked with the defense of northern West Germany and is
split into national corps sectors, arranged from north to
south: Dutch, German, British, and Belgian. Danish and
German forces combine in the defense of the Schleswig-
Holstein region, which borders on Denmark (Mearsheimer
1982, 10-11).
The opportunity this organization presents to the
Soviets stems from the fact that not all corps are created
equal. Therefore, the Soviets are likely to concentrate
attack on the weaker corps sectors such as the Dutch,
British, and Belgian in the NORTHAG region (Donnelly and
Petersen 1986, 1050).
Analyst John Yurechko suggests that the Soviets
could concentrate on "corps boundaries and command 'seams'
of NATO's various national force groupings" to enhance the
effectiveness of the attack and facilitate encirclement
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operations (1987, 38). Prior to actually destroying the
encircled corps, the Soviets might entertain peace
negotiations with the respective governments, using the
surrounded troops as "bargaining chips." (Yurechko 1987,
38)
Although the highly regarded West German troops would
have to be defeated in Schlewig-Holstein, the Soviets are
expected to devote considerable efforts to the defeat and
isolation of forces on the Jutland Peninsula, and, thus,
Denmark (Donnelly and Petersen 1986, 1047-1048)
.
By neutralizing the stronger U.S. and West German
corps with an economy of force and exploiting NATO's weaker
defenses with overwhelming force ratios, the Soviets may
expect to inflict a rapid political and military defeat
upon NATO (Donnelly and Petersen 1986, 1050) . The Soviet
Union may expect its sudden military success to result in
the political neutralization of Denmark and, subsequently,
the Netherlands and Belgium. Defeat of NATO's NORTHAG
would—the Soviets may reason—leave both the Netherlands
and Belgium highly vulnerable and, therefore, possibly
amenable to conditional peace with the USSR.
It may be more than coincidence that Soviet
writings note the success of initial German operations
during WWII against Denmark and Norway and the subsequent
success against Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and,
ultimately, France (Ivanov 1974, 8). Moreover, the lack of
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military preparation by the Belgium and Dutch governments
is identified as pre-determining their surrender, which,
in turn, "contributed to the rapid defeat of the main
Anglo-French forces in Belgium, Holland, and the northern
regions of France." (Ivanov 1974, 9) The Soviets observe
that the French were left strategically and morally
vulnerable, resulting in France's rapid surrender (Ivanov
1974, 9). Thus, as interpreted by the Soviets, the Germans
secured victory over the European mainland largely during
the initial period of the war.
Withdrawal by Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands
from a future conflict would not necessarily defeat the
West; it would, however, require substantial reformulation
of strategy by the remaining Western belligerents.
Certainly, the combined loss of forces, airfields,
territory, and key ports for receipt of reinforcements
would severely complicate the military response by those
Western nations still fighting.
The Soviets might hope that, rather than militarily
adjust to the new political-military situation, the Western
belligerents would concede the war to the Warsaw Pact and
endeavor to minimize losses in a conditional peace.
4 . Surprise
Regardless of whether the above scenario is a
realistic prediction for the direction of the Soviets' main
blow, the actual strategic direction will most likely be
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facilitated by the element of surprise. Soviet military
writings place great emphasis on surprise. It has been
suggested that "[t]he side achieving surprise can obtain a
decisive advantage." (Tyushkevich 19 69, 4 68)
Surprise in initiating a war would amount to
preemption, an option recognized in Soviet writings. For
example, a Soviet training lecture stresses "[o]nly he who
acts quickly, decisively, anticipating the enemy, can
achieve victory" (Repin 1985, 5), thus strongly implying
the merits of preemption. Moreover, Gareyev, in discussing
the Soviet military theorist Frunze, states that "the most
effective method of countering enemy countersrikes [is] the
use of preemptive active operations...." (1985)
One of the greatest advantages of surprise in
supplementing the main blow of the initial period of the
war may be its psychological impact. Frequently noted are
the psychological consequences of surprise upon the
opposing forces such as the loss of time caused by sudden
confusion, disorientation of individuals' mental
functions, disorganization of entire groups, fear,
increased mental strain, and an overall weakening of troop
morale (Paleski 1971, 505)
.
In addition, unless SACEUR/CINCEUR requests nuclear
use authorization in a period of immediate emergency,
79
Soviet surprise could disrupt the decision-making process*
through rapid military advances and the preemptive
destruction of NATO nuclear forces (Kelleher 1987, 461).
It is probable that a Soviet surprise attack would attempt
to achieve a sudden shift in the military correlation of
forces, thereby assisting attempts at diplomatic coercion.
It is conceivable that Soviet military and
diplomatic efforts could impose upon certain arrangements,
such as "dual key" systems**, to either slow or stop the
utilization of a portion of NATO's nuclear arsenal, thereby
complementing a Soviet surprise attack. A country facing
the prospect or the reality of defeat at the conventional
level of operations might agree to a separate peace with
the Soviets rather than risk the uncertain results of a
nuclear battle. The dual key system presents the potential
for an "operational veto" of nuclear use by a host nation
under Soviet duress or reconsidering its NATO commitment
(Kelleher 1987, 463). Of course, upon fulfillment of the
requirements of the INF Treaty, fewer U.S. and NATO
nuclear forces will be vulnerable to Soviet surprise attack
*See Blair 1987, 108-111 for a description of NATO
nuclear release procedures.
**Arrangements in which the U.S. controls the nuclear
warhead and a European host nation controls the delivery
system are called "dual key" systems. See Bracken 1983
138-140 for further discussion.
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and there will be fewer nuclear obstacles to Soviet
dominance of Europe.
One Soviet writer may have been acknowledging
NATO's political and military difficulties when he wrote
that the "conflicts and distrust existing among the member
nations of today's alliances and blocs make it extremely
difficult for them to utilize their forces and resources."
(Skirdo 1970, 118)
Questions arise as to whether the Soviets could
achieve the degree of surprise necessary to nullify NATO's
nuclear arsenal and thereby attain a position of coercive
dominance over some or all of the alliance. Some analysts
suggest that a successful offensive "from a standing start"
is possible and could exploit, not only NATO's nuclear
handicaps, but unprepared forward defenses and the lack of
defense in depth (Dick 1986, 10). The Soviets have noted
the need "to maintain in peacetime those armed forces which
would be in a position to reach at least the nearest
definite strategic war objectives before successive
echelons are mobilized and put into action." (Sokolovskiy,
ed. 1968, 245)
According to military analyst Phillip Karber, the
Soviets have more than adequate standing forces to initiate
a surprise attack:
in the absence of a prepared defense, given only a
partial modernization of the M-l fleets, with the
maldeployment of US units, if the Soviets have only a
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2 4 -hour lead time in movement they can blow through our
covering force at 10-to-l odds: they can get to our
defense positions with five times as many tank battalions
as fast as we can. (Schemmer 1987, 116)
The reading of strategic warning is likely to be
blurred by Soviet cover and deception. For example, the
Soviets acknowledge the utility of conducting operational
troop movements and deployments under the guise of an
exercise (Kiryan 1986) . Warsaw Pact exercises along the
Czechoslovakian border in 1968 served to prepare for the
eventual invasion (Vigor 1983, 135). Furthermore, the
exercises had ended, causing the Czechs to relax prior to
the assault (Vigor 1983, 135).
Part of Soviet deception and surprise may involve
the "development of a major attack in a direction least
expected by the enemy." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 19 68, 141) Such
a deception is conceivable in the northern Germany/
Schleswig-Holstein scenario discussed earlier.
The strongest NATO defenses are located in central
West Germany; therefore, the Soviets may choose the weaker
northern route to outflank the stronger forces on the
central front. In The Offensive . Sidorenko describes the
"axis of main attack" as being the "weakest point in the
enemy defense", thus an area ensuring "swift breakthrough
of the enemy defense and development of offensive at high
rates " (1970, 87)
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A prominent example of Soviet surprise concerning
the direction of the main attack involves the Manchurian
campaign of 1945. The campaign involved three fronts; the
primary front was correctly interpreted by the Japanese to
be the Trans-Baikal front. However, the main axis of
attack was presumed to be through the relatively
traversable Hailer Valley; another alternative, over the
Great Khinghan Mountains, was deemed impossible for large
numbers of motorized and mechanized troops. Contrary to
Japanese belief, the main, most powerful Soviet attack
occurred over the Greater Khinghan Mountains. For this,
and many other reasons, the Soviet Manchurian offensive
achieved its objectives in less than ten days. (Vigor
1983, 108-109)
In summary, a strategy enhanced by successful
surprise would contribute to objectives related to the
defeat of NATO. Successful surprise would likely
facilitate a rapid, deep territorial penetration aimed at
forcing Western nations to accept Soviet terms or to suffer
worse destruction. With enough nations removed from the
alliance or key nations neutralized, Soviet objectives for
the dissolution of NATO's political and military viability
might be met.
5. The Deep Strike Operation
Freguent reference is made in Soviet military
writings to the deep strike, involving both conventional
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and nuclear weapons, intended to rapidly disorganize the
enemy's deep rear area and complicate, if not undermine,
the enemy's war-fighting capability. Common
characteristics of the deep strike include combined
missile, aircraft, and naval attack and "deep penetration
into the rear of the enemy by airborne landing troops,
naval landing troops, and... land forces." (Dzhelaukhov
1966, 170)
The primary targets throughout the deep strike are
the nuclear weapons of the enemy (Shtrik 1968, 280). Thus,
if the attack is conventional, the intention is to prepare
"in such a way as to be in the most favorable position"
should nuclear use be initiated (Samorukov 1967, 259).
Recently, "high precision weapons" have been designated as
primary targets, in addition to nuclear weapons, probably
in recognition of the greater lethality of modern
conventional missiles (Gareyev 1985)
.
The Soviets devote special emphasis to two topics
that may be integral to the deep strike operation, critical
in disrupting the rear area and, ultimately, essential to
war termination objectives: enemy command and control and
the adversary's economic structure. For example,
historical writings have called attention to the effects
that Soviet attacks upon state administration centers and
military-industrial production facilities during WWII had
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on forcing the withdrawal of Finland and Hungary from the
German camp (Reshetnikov 1986, 29-30)
Similarly, the Soviets claim that Japan's failure
to attack "the vital centers" of the enemy or to destroy
the enemy's "military-economic potential" denied victory to
Tokyo in WWII despite great initial success (Ivanov 1974,
10)
Thus, Soviet writings have noted that "the main
objective of armed combat is directed not only against
enemy armed forces on the battlefields as was the case in
the past, but also against everything which determines the
viability of the government." (Skovorodkin 1967, 212)
Moreover, Gareyev argues that, based on "the importance of
the rear for the course and outcome of a war," it is
essential to "disrupt the enemy rear by launching attacks
against it and capturing its most important economic and
political centers...." (1985)
a. The Attack on C2
The Soviets attach extreme importance to
attacking political and military command and control. For
example, it may be relevant to future Soviet behavior that
a main aim of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was to
quickly secure control of the capital (U.S. Congress.
House. 1987, 52). As one Soviet writer observes: "A
disruption of the control over a country and its troops in
a theater of military operations can severely effect the
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course of events, and in difficult circumstances, can even
lead to defeat in a war." (Shirokov 1966, 207)
Accordingly, the need is cited for maintaining
knowledge of the location of both stationary and mobile
command posts and the associated hardness of such units
(Shirokov 1966, 207). Additionally, location of
communication centers and the related hardware such as
cables and satellites must be ascertained (Shirokov 1966,
207) .
Successful attacks against U.S. and NATO
satellites could be a tremendous force multiplier for the
Soviets. As noted by the Soviets, the "destruction of
hostile reconnaissance means" enhances surprise and, thus,
success (Kuleszynski 1971, 495) . Critical trans-Atlantic
communication links could be severed; crucial
reconnaissance assets could be blinded and deafened (Hansen
1984, 1623). In addition to the denial of information
concerning the details of the initial attack, subsequent
dispersal of tactical and strategic mobile missiles could
result in a decisive condition for the imposition of a
Soviet-dictated war termination (Hansen 1984, 1624).
Disruption of command and control could occur
internally as well as from external attack; possible Soviet
infiltration of the government and military should not be
overlooked. Jan Sejna claims that the Soviets infiltrated
the Dutch General Staff and the Turkish military (1982,
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128) ; in both cases it was assumed the infiltrations would
expedite the removal of the respective countries from a war
effort (1982, 139-140).
b. Economic Warfare
A second area of special Soviet emphasis
concerns the adversary's economic structure. On one hand,
the Soviets stress the destruction of the enemy's economic
potential and the subsequent effect upon that country's and
the coalition's war effort. As stated by Gareyev,
"[e]conomic conflict is carried out in the aim of ensuring
economic superiority over the enemy." (1985) Furthermore,
by attributing the concept to "Western theoreticians", the
Soviets state:
Under the conditions of massive use of nuclear weapons,
attacks upon economic objectives can knock small states
out of a war, sharply reduce the economic and moral
potential of the major countries of the world, and
thereby create the most favorable conditions for the
attainment of victory. (Shirokov 1968, 317)
On the other hand, the Soviets acknowledge that
"it is very important to determine which targets and enemy
economic regions should be left intact or rapidly
reconstructed and used in the interests of our own country
and for supplying the troops." (Shirokov 1966, 203)
Thus, economic targeting by the Soviet Union
is, apparently, not intended "to turn the large economic
and industrial regions into a heap of ruins...." (Shirokov
1966, 201) Nor do the Soviets necessarily expect that
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complete destruction of the enemy economy is initially
possible (Korniyenko and Korolev 1967, 30). Rather, such
targeting is aimed at specific vulnerabilities in the
overall military-economic structure of the adversary; the
intent is to cripple the capacity for war-fighting
(Shirokov 1966, 201).
c. The OMG
Integral to the concept of the deep strike are
troop operations in the enemy rear. For example, Western
analysts suggest that Soviet amphibious and airborne
assaults may serve to establish second fronts and to force
the withdrawal from the war of selected NATO governments
(Hines and Petersen 1983a, 710; Donnelly and Petersen 1986,
1050) . In addition, amphibious and airborne assaults could
supplement the deep ground force penetration characterized
by the OMG (Donnelly and Petersen 1986, 1049).
Western analysts describe the OMG as an
"advanced raid element", as large as an army, operating
ahead of the main forces to both facilitate the main
advance and to attack air and nuclear capabilities, command
and control, logistics, and reserves (Hines and Petersen
1983a, 716) . Advance would be expected to be rapid and
continuous to ensure "the constant holding of initiative."
(Gareyev 1985)
A primary consideration in the rapid insertion
would be to preclude NATO nuclear use by destroying weapons
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as well as establishing territorial proximity deep in
Western Europe, thereby negating the rationality of nuclear
use to combat the OMG (Donnelly 1984, 66). As surmised by
Christopher Donnelly, the role of the OMG is to contribute
to the "rapid collapse of NATO and the limiting of the war
to the battlefield." (1983, 128)
The value of the OMG in Soviet deep operations
may be partially attributed to NATO's shallow defenses
(Hines and Petersen 1986b, 570) . It is suggested that the
scale and depth of OMG penetrations and subsequent
encirclements would be highly problematic for NATO corps to
defend against or escape from (Hines and Petersen 1986b,
570) .
In addition to encirclement operations, the
OMG, in conjunction with the deep troop landings, may force
NATO "to fight in two directions, to their front and rear,
from the very outset of the offensive." (Hines and Petersen
1983b, 1392) Moreover, of critical importance may be the
use of large OMGs to seize or surround economic or
political centers to force NATO countries to sue for peace.
(Hines and Petersen 1984, 10)
Presumably, in addition to the military utility
of the OMG, the Soviets recognize the crushing effect on
morale and the will to fight that a rapid insertion of
enemy forces within a country can induce. Despair could
quickly be compounded by panic and confusion if, as hinted
89
by Gareyev, the OMG employs "special weapons" upon
"breaking through into the enemy rear...." (1985) CW/BW and
nuclear weapons may be those referred to in Soviet
terminology as "special."
The OMG, in short, may serve to expand a
"tactical breakthrough into an operational one" ; the
effects of its attack might be decisive in securing Soviet
objectives for war termination (Sokolov 1985, 3) .
d. Special Forces
Assisting the efforts of the more traditional
combat troops in the deep operation may be elements of
Soviet Spetsnaz, or special forces. Of special interest is
the probable role of Spetsnaz and the KGB in war to
assassinate political and military leaders.
A recent Congressional Research Service study
describes apparent Soviet preparations to "decapitate"
decision-makers in the event of high intensity conflicts
(U.S. Congress. House. 1987, 62). The study notes:
"Even a scattering of Soviet-controlled assassins and
saboteurs. . .could savage rival nerve centers at the onset
of surprise hostilities." (U.S. Congress. House. 1987,
62)
Allegedly, many Spetsnaz, KGB, and GRU
(military security) agents are kept in place inside target
countries. Victor Suvorov describes the existence of
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"sleeping" agent networks, "which would be brought into
action only in the event of war." (1983, 1213)
e. Partisan Warfare
Supplementing, and perhaps arranged by, Soviet
special forces may be what Soviet writings refer to as
"partisan warfare." Partisan warfare is described in
Military Strategy as an "important type of military
operation" which "disorganized the enemy rear and diverted
considerable enemy forces" during World War II
(Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 273) . Earlier in the book,
partisan warfare is attributed "strategic significance."
(Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 162)
Most Soviet writings discuss partisan warfare
in an historical context. However, there are also
implications for its importance in modern warfare. Colonel
Skirdo's book The People, the Army, the Commander describes
how "Soviet Partisan detachments" operated in France and
Italy during WWII (1970, 71). Furthermore, according to
Skirdo, Soviet arms and "partisan leadership training"
helped the resistance movements within Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia
during the war and afterwards to get "democratic regimes
established as soon as the invaders were expelled." (1970,
71)
Of significance to the initial period of the
war and as a possible connection between Soviet special
91
forces and partisan coordination, Skirdo, in reference to
WWII, notes:
On the eve of the Soviet troops' offensive operations,
the partisans intensified their blows against the enemy's
rear and communications, and paralyzed his operational
reserves. When the operation began, the partisans
blocked the enemy's routes of retreat, set ambushes, and
rendered the enemy's staffs ineffective. (197 0, 67)
He further claims that such activity was "planned and
coordinated with the combat operations of Soviet troops at
the front." (Skirdo 1970, 67)
A large portion of the Soviet writings concern
the activities of Soviet partisans on their own soil. Yet,
although it may be far-fetched speculation, Soviet efforts
to secure peacetime contacts may find wartime relevance in
the assistance, training, and direction of opposition
movements within various NATO countries. According to a
former East German intelligence officer, one of the reasons
that the Soviets expect to win a future war in Europe is
their claim that "[m]any West Germans who have been silent
until now, will take part in sabotage missions once
fighting begins." (Kempe 1984, 30)
Soviet writings do not discount a future
partisan movement; Skirdo claims that "if the imperialists
do unleash another war, it will evoke a massive partisan
movement and other forms of armed resistance in their
rear." (1970, 71) Moreover, Skirdo may have been thinking
of the U.S. and NATO when he wrote: "A partisan movement
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by the general populace is also quite possible in a country
used by an aggressor state to accommodate its troops,
military bases, and combat equipment." (1970, 73)
The Soviet Union has demonstrated its
propensity to support the intent and ideal of a movement,
then exploit joint success for its own unilateral benefit.
It should be recognized that, of the countries listed above
in which the Soviets assisted the creation of "democratic
regimes" after contributing to the partisan movements, all
quickly succumbed to communist rule; all but one
(Yugoslavia) became and remain Soviet satellites.
It is conceivable that preparatory acts of
decapitation, sabotage, and terrorism, combined with a
massive military deep strike operation, could go far in
administering the decisive blow the Soviets claim to be
possible in the initial period of war. Hence, it is also
conceivable that, given a sudden and staggering initiation
of war, countries within NATO would be neutralized, perhaps
convinced that their own self-preservation had come to
hinge on accepting Soviet terms. Soviet war efforts may
seek the negation of any alternative thoughts in NATO
deliberations.
f. SLOC Interdiction
Before concluding discussion of the Soviet deep
operation and its effect on war termination, the relevance
of SLOC (sea lines of communication) interdiction must be
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noted. According to the Soviets, "in a conventional war,
combat operations in disrupting ocean, sea, and air
shipping are acknowledged as necessary." (Zemskov 1969,
446)
Attacks by Soviet surface, sub-surface, and air
assets upon re-supply convoys to Europe could finally
determine the outcome of the war. However, it should not
be assumed that the Soviet Union would delay an anti-SLOC
campaign until its attack in Europe had faltered and the
U.S. had loaded its cargo for the trans-Atlantic crossing.
It is possible that the Soviets would preempt
re-supply, possibly by destroying crucial airports and sea-
ports on both sides of the Atlantic or by mining sea-ports,
making it difficult or impossible for NATO forces to
receive supplies. The deep strike should not be presumed
to be limited to Europe; destruction or prevention of
re-supply could force the realization upon NATO that the
war had been lost and that conditional surrender was the
only remaining hope.
g. Total Defeat of the Enemy's Armed Forces
Forcing the withdrawal from the war of alliance
members and disorganization of the enemy's rear area might
ultimately result in the complete military defeat of NATO.
However, Soviet objectives may not require the West's total
military defeat; rather, securing alliance dissolution and
disengagement of U.S. influence from Europe may be
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sufficient Soviet war termination objectives within the
context of an overall superpower strategic conflict.
On the other hand, the complete defeat of NATO
armed forces would present the USSR with unchallenged
hegemony on the European continent. Therefore, total
victory as an objective for terminating a war cannot be
discounted, especially in the event that the Soviets
achieve the stunning success envisioned for the initial
period of the war.* Furthermore, should the potential for
escalation dominance manifest itself into an operational
certainty, the Soviet Union may not be at all inclined to
limit its objectives.
Authoritative Soviet sources have indicated
"[t]he Soviet Union and the countries of people's
democracy, in order to protect their socialist
achievements, will be forced to adopt... aims directed
towards total defeat of the armed forces of the enemy.... 1 '
(Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 1983)
However, the Soviets have indicated recognition
of the difficulty involved in rapidly achieving complete
success, even in a nuclear war. For example, Gareyev,
ostensibly referring to WWI , writes of "the impossibility
of achieving the aims of a war by a single annihilating
*See Appendix, section D. , 4., b. for a discussion of
the potential problems of unabated military operations
driven by initial success.
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attack." (1985) Sidorenko states that "one can hardly count
on the fact that the attacker will succeed in destroying
all important objectives with one simultaneous nuclear
strike." (1970, 114) Further, he writes that nuclear
preemption of the enemy "is considered to be the decisive
condition for the attainment of superiority over him and
the seizure and retention of the initiative." (Sidorenko
1970, 115) But, preemption is not said to guarantee
complete victory.
Total victory is likely to require a long and
costly war. As noted in the previous chapter, the USSR may
plan for a war lasting at least one year (Sokolovskiy , ed.
1968, 28) Certainly, the "possibility of a protracted war"
is not denied by the Soviets (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 385).
A future war, explains Gareyev, will likely be of an
"extended, fierce and protracted nature...." (1985)
Hence, the Soviets recognize the potential for a
prolonged conflict, especially if, as previously argued,
the war-fighting is contained to the conventional level.
However, the imposition of total defeat may be viewed as
too immediately difficult and costly a war termination
objective. This is not to discount the ultimate goal of
the ideological victory of Communism; rather, a war in
Europe may present the opportunity for rapid but limited
objectives toward the defeat of the greatest threat
perceived by the Soviets: the United States.
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E. CONCLUSION
In summary, it is argued that a future war in Europe is
likely to be part of a greater conflict between the USSR
and the free societies of the West. Thus, a Soviet
war-winning strategy would be designed to insure the
ultimate defeat of the U.S. and other free countries. To
achieve this, NATO, as an effective military and political
alliance, may need only to be neutralized to remove it from
the balance in the overall East-West correlation of forces.
These Soviet objectives for war termination in Europe would
be decidedly limited and, as such, might only be temporary
relief for the countries of Western Europe while the
larger war is concluded with the U.S. and the other
remaining free countries.
Much of the Soviets success in a future war may depend
upon the effectiveness of their peacetime efforts both to
de-couple NATO politically, economically, and militarily as
well as to secure contacts located in the enemy rear area
for wartime utilization.
It may be argued that Soviet efforts to isolate or de-
couple nations from NATO have failed during nearly forty
years of peace. Moreover, war might dramatically and
fatalistically erase any political and diplomatic inroads
laid in popular support, thereby nullifying the strategy of
dissolving NATO. In addition, contacts of political and
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military significance in peacetime may not be available for
use or amenable to exploitation during war.
Perhaps the only certainty of war is the uncertainty
that will characterize its course. It is probable that
Soviet peacetime activities endeavor to limit such
uncertainty to the fullest extent possible. Moscow's
military strength may contribute to Soviet confidence in
the controllability of a war. Employment of Soviet
military capabilities could drastically affect the choices
made by any government in power in Western Europe. As two
Western analysts conclude, "[i]f the current balance of
forces remains unchanged, war termination for NATO will
likely be very close to the old-fashioned notion of
defeat." (Sloss and Stoppa-Liebl 1986, 112)
The probable extent of conventional or nuclear use in a
future war is certainly unknown. Nuclear warfare may be
undesirable in Soviet planning for a war in Europe because
of the risk of extensive collateral damage, problems of
command and control, and the likely complications in
securing a termination settlement. In a nuclear war,
communication of intent would be critical to purposeful war
termination but extremely problematic*
Conventional war could limit communication difficulty.
Rapid conventional success and the withholding of massive
See Appendix, section C. , 4., d. for discussion of
the problems of communication and war termination.
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nuclear destruction could more readily result in a Soviet
defeat of NATO because of the availability of the means to
indicate a desire for peace. The threat of greater
destruction might accelerate this process of war
termination.
In addition, the Soviet Union may need to win a war
quickly and decisively in Europe to prevent damage to the
cohesion of its own bloc, a problem discussed in the
following chapter.
Although only one scenario, the operation against
NORTHAG in the Western TVD, was highlighted in this
chapter, the intent was not to neglect possible Soviet
actions in the Southwestern or Northwestern TVDs. One
example was emphasized in order to illustrate the possible
application of Soviet military art.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the Soviets may
offer insight into their own thinking by ostensibly
describing NATO strategy. For example, one writer notes
that "[t]he main objective of a limited war in Europe would
be the elimination of the Socialist system in one of
several Warsaw Pact nations and a significant weakening Of
the Soviet Union [emphasis added]." (Semin 1983, 49)
Whether the Soviets are mirror-imaging their intentions for
NATO and the U.S. is uncertain. However, limited Soviet
objectives for terminating a war are arguably more
practical and attainable and would advance the ultimate
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Soviet objective of the victory of communism without (as
discussed in the following chapter) unraveling the
coalition that currently underpins Soviet security.
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IV. WARSAW PACT CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET
OBJECTIVES FOR WAR TERMINATION
A. INTRODUCTION
As the Soviets have noted, war can adversely affect
alliance cohesion and, therefore, alliance effectiveness
(Gareyev 198 5) . The extent to which an alliance is shaken,
combined with the actual importance of that alliance to the
overall war effort, could dictate the war termination
requirements of the coalition leader. Thus, alliances can
constrain as well as strengthen a coalition leader.
The Soviets have recognized that "during wars that are
waged by coalitions, the states at war have to take into
account also the politics and military-strategic position
of their allies. 11 (Byely and others 1972, 18) In a war in
Europe, the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) members could
constrain Moscow's objectives, depending on what the
Soviets expect of their allies and in what context allied
contributions occur. In addition, the amount of control
maintained over the allies may affect wartime performance.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance
of the Warsaw Pact to Soviet military strategy in Europe.
The degree of importance is a likely measure for the amount
of constraint that alliance upheaval could impose on Soviet
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war termination objectives. In general, objectives for war
termination are concerned with the type of victory sought
—
for example, whether a total or limited victory is
acceptable. In other words, war termination objectives
seek the conditions deemed necessary to resolve the armed
conflict.
In this chapter, the importance of the Warsaw Pact in
Soviet military doctrine is identified. The possible
character of a future war and its influence on the Warsaw
Pact is then discussed. Included are considerations of the
war's duration, the impact of success or failure, the
possibility of conventional or nuclear combat, and,
finally, the effect of offensive or defensive operations
and missions. The discussion focuses on the Warsaw Treaty
Organization (WTO) in general, even though it is recognized
that important differences characterize individual NSWP
members
.
Attempts at predicting the behavior and intention of
countries and alliances inherently lack quantitative
precision. Moreover, information relative to the Warsaw
Pact is limited by the secretive nature of the alliance
(Nelson 1984, 3). However, it is proposed that, during a
war, the limits of Soviet control, the faults in alliance
cohesion, and the importance of the NSWP militaries to
Soviet strategy could interact to constrain Moscow's
objectives for war termination.
102
B. UNIFIED MILITARY DOCTRINE
Soviet control of Eastern Europe is codified in the
Warsaw Treaty. In April 1985, the WTO members extended the
"Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance"
for twenty years, with a subsequent extension for ten more
(Khvorostyanov 198 6, 8) . Thus, the Soviets have secured
the agreement of the East European participants to continue
the alliance; from Moscow's perspective, this likely
entails unquestioned Soviet leadership and a unified
military doctrine based on Soviet military strategy.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, "NSWP
plans, doctrine, tactics, training, force structure, and
readiness are shaped according to Soviet dictates," thus
guaranteeing Soviet control over alliance action (1987,
19) . MSU Kulikov, current Commander in Chief of the Warsaw
Pact Joint Armed Forces, confirmed this in in stating that
"[t]he combat alliance of the fraternal peoples of the
socialist countries and their armies has a united
military-strategic foundation" and a "coordinated military
doctrine." (Kulikov 1985, 84)
Thus, with a unified military doctrine, the Soviets can
shape and organize the alliance to complement Moscow's
objectives. Kulikov emphasizes this point in stating that
"[a] unity of views on fundamental problems of military
organizational development, the nature of modern warfare
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and the methods of waging it naturally constitutes an
extremely important consolidating factor." (1972, 16)
The characteristic features of the Soviet military
experience, according to Kulikov, that apply to the
socialist community, include the "defense of the socialist
homeland and the conquests of socialism." (1972, 16)
Foremost is defense of the socialist homeland (the Soviet
Union) with the remainder of the socialist community
occupying secondary status.
The idea of a unified military doctrine is contained
within the Soviet concept of coalition warfare. In an
article in Vovenno-Istoricheskiv Zhurnal (Military History
Journal ) , Colonel General Altukhov identified the features
and considerations of coalition warfare, based on Soviet
experiences in World War II. Included are common war aims
within the coalition; the composition of troops within
operational and strategic groupings; the specific
requirements of organization, weapon, and training
interaction; and "the relationships between the governments
of the nations participating in the coalition...."
(Altukhov 1982, 42)
The key to successful coalition warfare, according to
Altukhov, is the maintenance of "direct control over the
allied troops" by the coalition command (1982, 42). Such
control would require the "unconditional subordination to
the coalition command by all the allied troops regardless
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of their national affiliation." (Altukhov 1982, 43)
Furthermore, essential to control of coalition troops is a
compatible command and control system "in technical,
organizational and methodological terms." (Altukhov 1982,
44) Altukhov leaves little doubt over the identity of the
coalition command capable of providing the requisite
control in noting that in World War II "an important role
in organizing the joint operations of the Allied armies was
played by the Soviet Supreme High Command and the general
staff." (1982, 44)
Inherent in a Soviet-imposed unified military doctrine
is the comprehensive integration of the alliance system.
Kulikov noted the requirement of "monolithic unity...
encompassing all activities of societal activity, politics,
economics, ideology and culture" and the maintenance of
"armed defense" until imperialism "ceases to exist." (1972,
17) It appears that, in the ideal, a unified military
doctrine entails a national submission to the Soviet system
of control and integral participation, should a war occur
in Europe, toward the attainment of Soviet objectives for
war termination.
C. CHARACTER OF THE WAR
Maintaining the alliance throughout the war is
essential to Soviet objectives. As Kulikov stated in a
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1972 edition of the restricted Soviet General Staff journal
Vovennava mvsl f (Military Thought )
,
an important role... will be played by the viability and
strength of the military coalitions not only from an
economic and military standpoint but also from a morale
and political point of view, that is on the whole the
social capability of withstanding the sternest tests of
war. (1972, 19)
Thus, coalition unity would be a consideration for the
Soviets during the course of a future war as well as a
consideration in terminating that war.
Additionally, as discussed in chapter II, Soviet
Marxist-Leninist theory claims that "[p]olitics plays the
decisive role not only in the preparations for war but also
in its conduct." (Byely and others 1972, 16) Within this
political determinism are "measures taken to strengthen
allied relations within the coalition and the general
strategic plan of the war" (Byely and others 1972, 17),
indicating a definite role within Soviet military strategy
for NSWP forces.
The role assigned to NSWP forces is a function of the
character of the war. The Soviets recognize the "character
of a war" as a contributing element within a state's
wartime "moral-political potential" (Ogarkov 1983d) .
Therefore, it is likely that the Soviets will calculate into
the correlation of forces the character of a war being
fought and its effect upon the belligerents. Their
calculation will determine the employment of NSWP forces
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within Soviet military strategy. The extent to which
Soviet forecasting is correct and the amount of emergent
wartime adjustment necessary may affect war termination
objectives.
1. Duration
It is generally assumed that a "quick, decisive
victory" (Nelson 1984, 10) is more favorable for
maintaining alliance cohesion than a prolonged war. In
terms of the WTO, analysts speculate that "the longer
militaries of East Europe are required to perform, the more
one should doubt the full application of their available
forces" due to increasing strains inherent in a wartime
mobilization (Nelson 1984, 10). Based on his analysis,
Daniel Nelson estimates that NSWP force reliability would
become questionable eleven to thirteen days into an
invasion and it is unlikely that reliability could be
maintained beyond eight weeks (Nelson 1984, 12).
This analysis should neither be surprising nor one
from which NATO should derive undue optimism. Although
NATO is not bound by coercion, allied reliability may be
brought into question sooner by virtue of inadequate
defenses. It is proverbial that military alliances
throughout history have been unable to withstand the
strains of war.
The relative question for the Warsaw Pact is how
long the Soviets will be able to maintain alliance
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cohesion. Analyst C.J. Dick speculates that "the Warsaw
Pact is a brittle grouping of fair-weather friends which is
likely to disintegrate if exposed to great or prolonged
strain." (1983, 1715)
However, a Rand interview study of East European
emigres revealed "a noticeable trend in the evolution of
the attitudes of our respondents toward rank-and-file
reliability," possibly due to unit camaraderie and mutual
dependence (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 43) .
Thus, while Western analysts may conclude that the Warsaw
Pact is an ailing alliance, it may be totally inaccurate to
expect war to facilitate a substantial national backlash
against Soviet control. War is a very unpredictable
stimulus.
It is reasonable, however, to presume that, without
consideration of potential interactive effects from events
within the NATO alliance, the longer the war, the more
resistance from NSWP forces to Soviet objectives (Van
Oudenaren 1984, 18).
Respondents in the Rand emigre study indicated that
protracted conflicts or military reversals could facilitate
a breakdown in control and lead to significant numbers of
desertions (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 98) .
Furthermore, the precarious socioeconomic conditions within
East Europe are likely to worsen as the war progresses
(Nelson 1984, 26). The Soviets may have recognized the
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disruptive potential posed by East European forces and may
limit the offensive role of NSWP forces in a war (Alexiev,
Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 60)
.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Soviet
strategy in Europe will likely attempt a "rapid rate of
advance and rapid deep exploitation" (Ogarkov 1982) of
Western Europe to guickly achieve NATO's capitulation. In
this short war scenario, particularly if preceded by only
limited warning or surprise attack against NATO, the
majority of former East European servicemen interviewed by
Rand predicted reliable NSWP participation (Alexiev,
Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 101). To improve the odds of
NSWP reliability, the Soviets would probably employ only
the NSWP forces believed to be most dependable.
According to a former East German intelligence
officer interviewed in The Wall Street Journal , the Soviets
exercise GDR forces for an offensive against West Europe.
However, although the plan is to reach the Atlantic in
seven days, only Soviet troop movements are expected after
the fourth day. Thus, the Soviets may recognize limited
NSWP troop reliability, even among GDR forces, and plan to
employ them only initially until Soviet follow-on echelons
arrive. (Kempe 1984, 30)
2 . Success versus Failure
The Soviet observation that "[v]ictories or defeats
have an enormous effect on belligerent .. .states" supports
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speculation that success or failure is likely to affect
NSWP reliability (Byely and others 1972, 20). The USSR may
hope that early battlefield success would create a
perception among East European regimes of Soviet
invincibility and, thus, futility to do other than follow
in the Red Army wake (Yurechko 1987, 32).
On the other hand, failure seems certain to disrupt
and possibly destroy Warsaw Pact cohesion. As analyst
Stephen Cimbala suggests, "the USSR, having crossed the
threshold of war with the West..., would be hard pressed to
justify this exertion without bringing about some change in
the post-conflict military and political balance of power."
(Cimbala [1988], 309) The inability to secure even minimal
objectives could prompt rapid WTO dissolution.
According to Rand's emigre study, "[m]ost
respondents felt there were strong limits on reliability
should a Soviet offensive against West Europe falter or be
reversed." (Alexiev, Johnson, Kliszewski 1986, 101) Failure
would likely be manifested in passive resistance,
defections, and possibly active military resistance
(Herspring and Volgyes 1979, 284).
Morale is likely to be adversely affected by
wartime failure. The difficulty of persuading people to
accept ideological justifications for war in an atmosphere
largely devoid of ideological acceptance is likely to be
exacerbated by unsuccessful operations. Although MSU
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Kulikov describes Marxism-Leninism as the "ideological
foundation of the unity of the Warsaw pact countries"
(1985, 84), evidence suggests that ideological
indoctrination of NSWP troops is met with skepticism and
may be counterproductive (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski
1986, 24).
According to the Rand study of East European
emigres, "the gulf between propaganda and reality is a
major cause of military disenchantment." (Alexiev, Johnson,
and Kliszewski 1986, 36) Thus, ideological credibility is
waning and accompanying it may be the commitment of large
percentages of East European military personnel to defend
the regimes that perpetuate the hoax of Marxism-Leninism.
Daily exposure to Western sources of information by East
European military personnel is a constant stress upon the
alliance's ideological fault (Alexiev, Johnson, and
Kliszewski 1986, 25).
Although the subject is highly speculative, it can
be reasonably assumed that NSWP reliability would remain
high and thus supportive of Soviet objectives for war
termination in a successful war. However, in the event of
failure, defensive or de-escalatory options may be
inconsistent with Soviet Warsaw Pact control (Kime 1982,
69) . Should the war effort stall or go against the WTO,
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the Soviets may be required to restrict their objectives or
change the character of the war to a more destructive mode.
3 . Nuclear or Conventional War
As discussed in earlier chapters, the Soviet
perspective on nuclear and conventional war seems to
indicate a preference for limiting hostilities to the
conventional level, using their apparent potential for
escalation dominance to negate the utility of the Western
nuclear arsenals. The Soviets would expect to win the war
by virtue of their conventional superiority and through
rapid advances that could otherwise be hindered by nuclear
use (Hines, Petersen, and Trulock 1986, 8)
.
A conventional warfighting strategy is likely to be
less abhorred by the NSWP countries than a nuclear
strategy. Furthermore, a conventional war may be more in
keeping with the maintenance of Soviet control, both of the
course of the war and the course of their allies, given the
probability that mutual nuclear exchanges would disrupt
command and control mechanisms (Hines, Petersen, and
Trulock 1986, 8). Although a conventional war might not
achieve the rapid victory needed by the Soviets to
preclude ruptures in WTO cohesion, neither would a nuclear
war equate to a rapid victory. Even in a nuclear war that
might be geographically and militarily limited, control
would be a precarious variable. Hence, a conventional war
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Offensive or Defensive Operational Employment
In general, the employment of non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact forces in offensive operations may be expected to
qualitatively affect NSWP force reliability compared to
employment in defensive or support operations. Should NSWP
forces engage in offensive operations, reliability, and
therefore termination objectives, could be highly
qualified, depending on the war's duration and success.
Conversely, a defensive war fought in East Europe
might elicit a higher level of reliability and a stubborn
termination strategy—though this hypothesis obviously
lacks political credibility, since it assumes offensive
NATO operations in Eastern Europe. The implausibility of
this assumption and NATO's physical incapacity to undertake
such operations make this hypothesis one of mainly
theoretical interest. However, utilization of NSWP
militaries in a defensive role to repel potential limited
counter-attacks by NATO forces or to provide support to
Soviet offensive forces may be integral to Soviet military
strategy.
In either offensive or defensive operations, the
importance of the NSWP forces to Soviet military strategy
and the role assigned to these forces will have a
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corresponding influence on the course of the war and the
attainment of Soviet objectives,
a. Offensive Operations
The Soviets train the Warsaw Pact forces to
conduct offensive operations. Warsaw Pact exercises such
as "Druzhba-81" and "Shield-82" have stressed deep
territorial objectives, high speed offensive operations,
and improved command and control over the forces involved
(Simon 1985, 194-195, 215) . However, employment of NSWP
forces in offensive operations is problematic, thus
reliability in an offensive role is questionable.
Referring to what they term "external-offensive
reliability," Herspring and Volgyes propose that NSWP
soldiers will be less effective fighting for an unpopular
regime or a regime not representing the national interest.
Should the war aims favor Soviet interests to the exclusion
of the NSWP country's interests, the East European troops
may fight but only to survive, not necessarily to win.
Herspring and Volgyes conclude that WTO reliability is
contingent on the East European populations* perceiving
consistency between their own national interests and that
of the USSR*; the analysts note that "as recent events in
Eastern Europe have shown, under most circumstances, such a
development is unlikely." (Herspring and Volgyes 1979, 284)
*See Appendix, section D. , 4., d. for discussion of
coalition dynamics from the Western perspective.
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However, the duration of the war may qualify
the assumptions of Herspring and Volgyes. For example,
Rand found general agreement among the former East European
servicemen interviewed that East European armies would
reliably support Soviet objectives during the initial
offensive, implying that such support would diminish with
time (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 98)
.
Given the offensive strategy likely to be
employed by the Soviets in a future war and Ogarkov's
premise that this war "will assume a coalition character
from the very outset and will pursue political and
strategic aims," NSWP forces seem integral to Soviet
success (1982) . Depending upon the degree of strategic or
tactical surprise attempted, NSWP participation could be
critical to Soviet success (Simon 1985, 1). In recognizing
that the "augmentation of strategic efforts in a modern
world war... is a coalition problem, since it is impossible
to solve this problem on a scale of just the armed forces
of single nation," the value of NSWP forces within Soviet
strategy is acknowledged (Dzhelauklov 1964, 56).
However, not all NSWP forces will necessarily
be employed within a Soviet-led military offensive.
Ogarkov appears to refer to role differentiation within WTO
military strategy in stating that
national particularities of the corresponding countries,
which are related to the level of development which they
have achieved, their geographical position and possible
115
nature of actions of the probable enemy are taken into
account (1985)
.
Warsaw Pact military exercise patterns may
indicate which forces are integral to Soviet offensive
planning*. Of 24 maneuvers held between 1961-1967, 18
occurred in the Warsaw Pact "Northern Tier" states of East
Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (Caravelli 1983, 396).
More recent exercises such as the 1969 Oder-Neisse
maneuvers, "Shield-76", and "Opal-87" involved only the
Northern Tier states and the Soviet Union (Jones 1980, 18;
U.S. DIA 1977, 13; Staar 1987, 359).
Additionally, since the mid-1970 's, Hungary has
been a frequent participant in exercises held in the
Northern Tier (Johnson 1981, 27) . Recent examples include
"Danube-84" and "Druzhba-86" (Staar 1984, 355; Dean 1987,
30)
Thus, the Soviets train to interact with the
Northern Tier states along with Hungary. Rand analyst A.
Ross Johnson argues that this reflects a greater strategic
dependence on Northern Tier forces born from Soviet
concerns over China and the Afghanistan conflict (Johnson
1981, 18-19) . However, the prominence of the Western TVD
in a European war and the geographic position of the
*It must be noted that Warsaw Pact exercises serve
various functions in addition to operational planning,
including external political signaling and intra-alliance
peacetime control and cohesion. See Caravelli 1983; Jones
1980.
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Northern Tier countries is the likely explanation for the
utility of the northern WTO members in Soviet military
strategy.
The fact that the Northern Tier forces train
for offensive operations was confirmed by a former East
German intelligence officer, who stated in The Wall Street
Journal that " [t]he first strike always began from our
side" (Kempe 1984, 1)* Furthermore, according to the
intelligence officer, Soviet and East German troops always
practiced the offensive; the predominant goal was the
destruction of the enemy on its own territory (Kempe 1984,
1, 30) .
Another former East European officer
interviewed by A. Ross Johnson claims that thirty percent
of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier first strategic echelon
consists of NSWP forces (1981, 4) . Apparently, elite
national contingents from NSWP forces comprise these first
echelon forces and are designated for immediate Soviet use
under the guise of the Warsaw Pact (Kulikov 1985, 88)
Primary among the Northern Tier forces in
Soviet strategy are the East Germans (Staar 1977, 226).
The GDR forces are believed to be completely integrated
*The reason for always taking the offensive, explained
the intelligence officer, was because of alleged ability
"to read the enemy's intentions and attack before he can."
(Kemp 1984, 1) This is significant in light of recent
revelations on the Walker spy ring.
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within the Warsaw Pact first strategic echelon (Johnson,
Dean, and Alexiev 1980, 79). The role of the GDR in Soviet
military strategy may have been developed early; between
1956-1970, for example, twenty of twenty one Northern Tier
exercises included East Germany and fourteen of the twenty
were held within the GDR (Hoensch 1982, 44). Nelson
suggests the present level of East German integration
within the WTO surpasses the other alliance members,
possibly indicating the unequal value of the GDR to Soviet
strategy (Nelson 1984, 22-23).
Currently, the armed forces of the GDR are
among the best equipped in the Warsaw Pact, although Poland
and Czechoslovakia are also comparatively well equipped,
quantitatively and qualitatively. However, despite ongoing
modernization efforts, "there remains a considerable
•generation gap' between the Soviet Union's own equipment
in Eastern Europe and that of the forces of its European
allies." (The Military Balance 1987-1988 1987, 46-53)
Although it would seem inconsistent with Soviet
war objectives to permit Warsaw Pact arsenals to lag behind
the state of the art, Moscow may desire capability
incongruence as a hedge against alliance instability or, as
Viktor Suvorov suggests, may be by strategic design. Soviet
control over the procurement of WTO arsenals could provide
a means of delineating the role played by each NSWP
member. Suvorov describes the forces of the NSWP as
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supplementary elements to round out Soviet armies and
fronts; thus, the East European militaries are integral to
the Soviet armed forces and Soviet strategy (1982,
125-127)
.
Less integral, however, at least in an
offensive capacity, appear to be the Southern Tier states.
As mentioned previously, Hungary may be important to Soviet
objectives in north and central Europe; Bulgaria and
Romania may be almost inconsequential to Soviet war
objectives. For example, only Romania participated in
fewer Warsaw Pact exercises than Bulgaria between 1961-1979
and even those exercises were support, not offensive,
oriented (Holloway 1984, 27). Furthermore, Romania has
unilaterally limited itself to defensive operations within
its own borders (Volgyes 1982, 45). It appears that the
role of the Southern Tier states in Soviet military
strategy may be confined to defense of, and maintaining
stability in, the Warsaw Pact southern flank.
A strategic consideration for the Soviets in an
offensive employment of NSWP troops would be the match up
of traditional enemies, not only as foes but as allies.
The Poles, for example, have historic bonds with the
Americans, the French, and the British but antagonisms
against the Germans and the Romanians (Herspring and
Volgyes 1979, 289). Moreover, historical antagonisms run
deep throughout the WTO (Herspring and Volgyes 1979,
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280-282) . Thus, the employment of NSWP forces in offensive
operations could involve divisive consequences although the
intensity of historic relationships is likely to be
tempered by the effects of war.
Soviet efforts that minimize mobilization
procedures and incorporate NSWP forces within much larger
Soviet force groupings could improve prospects for
effective initial offensive employment of East European
troops (Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev 198 0, 121) . According
to John Yurechko, there are NSWP forces that are
immediately subordinate to Warsaw Pact commands presided
over by Soviets; in the event of war the ability of East
European governments to control their own troops would
effectively be precluded (1987, 31-32). Moreover, NSWP
force integration is apparently practiced during large and
small scale WTO exercises, incorporating units (regiments)
and subunits (battalions) into Soviet divisions, armies,
and fronts (Jones 1984, 244-257).
The rapidity of events and the dominance of
surrounding Soviet forces would likely leave no immediate
alternative but to participate in the offensive (Rakowska-
Harmstone 1984, 339). Mobilization subsequent to the start
of a war and the movement of Soviet reserve echelons
through East Europe could inhibit any developing
inclinations of NSWP resistance (Yurechko 1987, 32).
Alternatively, an extended pre-war mobilization would not
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only alert NATO, it could stimulate feelings of nationalism
and dissent antagonistic to Soviet control
(Rakowska-Harmstone 1984, 340).
b. Defensive Operations
A recent Soviet article declared that "[t]he
military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member states is
strictly a defensive one." ("Military Doctrine" 1987, 70)
In the highly unlikely (and, indeed, essentially
fictitious) hypothesis that East European armies might find
themselves fighting a defensive war against NATO, it is
naturally assumed that homeland defense would prompt a
heroic effort.
If the East European forces perceived that
their country's survival was threatened, then a determined
defense would be possible (Herspring and Volgyes 1979,
280) . For example, East Europeans interviewed by Rand
"foresaw greater reliability in a scenario in which NSWP
armies perceived their mission as defending national
territory against a Western incursion." (Alexiev, Johnson,
and Kliszewski 1986, 101)
However, the fact that the NSWP regimes are an
unnatural outgrowth of the Soviet Union might instead
result in a welcome for the forces from the West, similar
to that initially bestowed upon the Nazi invaders in the
Ukraine during World War II. Should this ever occur, some
have observed, it would be hoped that Western forces would
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be better at recognizing and seizing such an opportunity
than were the Nazis. (Rakowska-Harmstone 1984, 344-345)
As noted earlier, a utilization of NSWP
militaries in certain defensive operations might vitally
support the offensive operations of Soviet and selected
non-Soviet forces. Warsaw Pact forces might be more
reliable fulfilling a support role, and Soviet war
termination objectives could thus remain largely unhindered
by alliance constraints.
The Soviet view of wartime operations requires
a strong rear and the "defense and holding of important
regions of one's territory." ( Soviet Military Encyclopedia
1979, 94). Furthermore, the Soviets note (and certainly
hope) that the W.T.O. "ensures that reserves and resources
may be maneuvered effectively, and facilitates the
organization of defense, including air defense, supply of
material, and troop movement." (Skirdo 1970, 14) Thus, NSWP
forces could be valuable in a defensive mission.
An important NSWP defensive function to the
overall Soviet war effort would be protection of logistics.
Although the Soviets apparently attempt to minimize
logistical dependence on their allies, East Europe's
position between the Soviet Union and the West
geographically stretches vulnerable supply lines (Van
Oudenaren 1984, 19). Thus, in a European war, the Soviets
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would require East European assurance of safe passage for
resupply and reinforcement (Papp 1978, 62).
Preceding resupply from the Soviet Union would
be the use of ammunition, fuel, and oil stocks forward
deployed throughout East Europe. According to the U.S.
Department of Defense, these stores amount to a sixty to
ninety day supply. Distribution of these and other war
materials will be assisted by the NSWP transportation
infrastructure, supervised by a Soviet command, and
probably protected by East European forces. (U.S. DOD
1987, 100-101)
The Soviets seem to have enough doubt over
allied reliability that measures have been taken to
minimize possible disruptions of even a support role. For
example, a ferry system across the Black Sea is available
to Bulgaria, thus bypassing Romania (O'Ballance 1982, 58).
Similarly, in the event that Poland disrupts the Soviet war
effort, a ferry system has been developed to deliver
supplies from the USSR directly to East Germany (Brown and
Johnson 1984, 15). To preclude such disruption, however,
the Soviets have allegedly disguised their own troops in
Polish uniforms and deployed them at critical installations
such as airfields, arms depots, and communication centers;
presumably, the Soviets have taken similar precautions
throughout East Europe (Kempe 1984, 30).
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Another major function of the East European
countries appears to be the supplementing of the Soviet air
defense system. The Soviets have long recognized that air
defense requires "time and space" as well as "the
coordinated actions of large air defense forces not of a
single country but of several." (Zabelok 1971, 109)
Further, the Soviets conclude that "[c]oalition air defense
is a characteristic feature of military and political
integration." (Zabelok 1971, 123)
Hence, it follows that the East European air
defense systems are directly subordinate to the Soviet air
defense command (Voiska PVO) in Moscow (Johnson, Dean, and
Alexiev 1980, 17) . The PVO command links the Soviet air
defense districts with the air early warning and defense
networks of each NSWP country (Lewis 1982, 114). The
central integration and control indicates the importance of
the NSWP defenses to the Soviets; loss of this outer air
defense system could severely disrupt Soviet war
objectives.
Finally, the USSR may depend on East European
forces to tend order in the rear while the Soviets are
occupied to the West; however, history does not represent
this option as viable. Herspring and Volgyes cite seven
post-WWII cases where East European armed forces refused to
support their respective governments during a "serious
internal disturbance." (1979, 278-279).
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Neither does history present the Soviets with
favorable examples of joint Warsaw Pact restraint of an
errant member. Although East German, Polish, Hungarian,
and Bulgarian forces assisted in the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968, their involvement was essentially
symbolic. While as many as twenty three Soviet
divisions comprised the invasion force, the NSWP
augmentation consisted of a total of five divisions and a
brigade (Lewis 1982, 154). Furthermore, most significant
operations and occupations were performed solely by Soviet
forces (Lewis 1982, 142).
Any symbolic dividends derived from East
European cooperation and participation in the
Czechoslovakian invasion quickly became negative. For the
NSWP invaders, the experience was demoralizing even though
the East European forces were quickly withdrawn. As Robin
Remington suggests, the "demoralizing impact on East
European participants has substantial implications. .. for
more prolonged occupations by Moscow. " (1984, 51)
Wartime implications for suppression and
occupation of an 'ally' are likely to be more problematical
for Moscow. Dependence on NSWP forces for intra-alliance
domestic control would probably be greater. However, in
any situation requiring force against civilians, especially
by indigenous troops, reliable execution would be doubtful
(Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 79, 101). The
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respondents in the Rand emigre study concur that violence
against fellow countrymen could only be ordered under the
threat of similar reprisals for disobedience (Alexiev,
Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 96)
.
Hence, the NSWP forces may be more reliable in
defensive operations than in offensive operations but even
this assumption must be highly qualified. The likely
defensive and support duties assigned to NSWP forces are
not incidental to Soviet military strategy. A breakdown in
logistics, air defense, or domestic control could require a
diversion of Soviet forces, thus reducing overall military
effectiveness (Simon 1985, 2) . Use of Soviet reserve
echelons could diminish the scope, pace, and intensity of
the offensive, possibly requiring alteration of Soviet
strategic objectives.
Moreover, the Soviets would probably be
apprehensive about leaving a large percentage of the armed
East European troops between the Soviet front forces and
the USSR. Even in a 'safe 1 supporting role, the NSWP
countries could disrupt the Soviet warfighting strategy and
adversely affect Soviet objectives for war termination.
D. CONCLUSION
The functional importance of the Warsaw Pact to Soviet
military strategy creates a constraint upon Soviet war
termination objectives. The pervasive system of control
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and integration probably reflects the degree of importance
the NSWP countries represent in the Soviet correlation of
forces.
However, peacetime intra-alliance trends reveal cracks
in cohesion that the strains of war could decisively
rupture. Potent peacetime controls may become ineffective
in a continental war. As Edward Atkeson suggests, "there
is a basic 'fault line'—not unlike a seismological fault
—
running between the Soviets and their allies, which, if
subjected to great stress, could rupture, with serious
ramifications for Soviet fortunes." (1986, 111-112)
It is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact is merely a
peacetime trophy of Soviet power, a transparent icon of
communist ideology. The Soviets acknowledge that "the
stability of a coalition" has significant bearing on "the
guestion of victory." (Sokolovskiy and Cheredichenko 1968,
392) In the event of a war in Europe, given the offensive
essence of Soviet military strategy, the Warsaw Pact is
critical to the Soviet defeat of NATO—an objective that is
unlikely to be open to compromise. The Soviets convey the
impression that they fear that if NATO survives, the USSR
may not.
The Soviets have long recognized that to achieve
complete victory, "it is necessary to complete the rout of
remaining and resisting formations of enemy armed forces
and to occupy important strategic areas on enemy
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territory." (Iovlev 1963, 9) In addition, it is necessary
to hold one's own territory as well as retaining captured
territory (Iovlev 1963, 9). The Soviets could not expect to
conduct such a war without the NSWP forces.
However, the Soviets are unlikely to limit the NSWP
duties to defense of the rear while the Red Army prosecutes
the front. In ostensibly describing the wartime tendencies
of imperialist coalition leaders, the Soviets have noted
the utility of exhausting the strength of alliance members
to ensure they "follow in the political wake of the power
in question." (Byely and others 1972, 15) The writers may
have been mirror-imaging, or perhaps implicitly revealing,
a Soviet intent to exploit the Warsaw Pact militaries to
defeat the enemy, thus strengthening the preponderance of
Soviet power within the alliance.
Although the Warsaw Pact is generally viewed in the
West as an integral element of Soviet power, undue optimism
over questionable WTO wartime cohesion is too often
heralded as the West's unbeatable wildcard. While the
Warsaw Pact has severe problems, some observers have
declared that the Western alliance may have disunity
problems of its own, especially in the event of selective
Soviet attacks (Ikle, Wohlstetter, and others 1988, 34).
It would be dangerous, at any rate, to place excessive
confidence in expectations that NSWP soldiers would double
their risks in war by turning on the Soviets while missiles
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and bullets fly in from the West. The Rand study of East
European emigres concluded that NSWP reliability is higher
than often assumed (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986,
102) .
However, the character of a war could greatly affect
reliability. The same Rand study also concluded that
Soviet control is precarious and under tremendous
strain; an unfavorable shift in the fortunes of war could
devastate NSWP reliability (Alexiev, Johnson, and
Kliszewski 1986, 102)
.
Moreover, Stephen Rosen notes that the Soviet Union has
a history of mutiny within its empire. For example, Rosen
describes a report that, in 1941, 100,000 Lithuanians drove
the Red Army from Soviet Lithuania (1986, 77). In
addition, Rosen cites reports of non-Russian soldiers
fleeing battle in large numbers in 1942 in the Ukraine and
Volga regions of the Soviet Union (1986, 77) . According
to Rosen, as many as two million Soviet citizens may have
operated in some support capacity for the Nazi invaders
(1986, 78)
.
In conclusion, the NSWP forces are essential to the
realization of Soviet objectives in a war in Europe,
although control and reliability are uncertain variables.
Though not addressed in this chapter, the possibility that
a future war might be fought on more than just the European
front could increase the importance of the Warsaw Pact
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(Erickson 1981, 168) . In any war with NATO, however, the
performance of NSWP forces would enhance or degrade the
prospects for Soviet success (Alexiev, Johnson, and
Kliszewski 1986, 3) . Thus, the coalition developed to




This thesis has analyzed a number of key arguments
relating to the possibility of limited Soviet objectives
for terminating a war. Should a war occur in Europe, for
example, it is suggested that the Soviets might enter such
a war with definite but limited objectives, the attainment
of which could define Moscow's conditions for terminating
combat. These conditions may include the political and
military dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of U.S.
military power from the continent, thereby neutralizing the
Western alliance and establishing de facto Soviet hegemony
over the European continent.
In other words, the common belief in the West that the
Soviets would accept no less than total, unconditional
victory, secured in a strategic nuclear war, may be a
flawed and unrealistic thesis that accepts too much of the
Soviet public diplomacy line. According to the Soviets,
political objectives are "of decisive importance for
gaining victory in war" (Skirdo 1970, 98) . However, a
nuclear war fought for total victory might preclude the
attainment of political objectives of any utility.
The historically cautious Soviets are not likely to aim
for a pyrrhic victory. Rather, the Soviets recognize that
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political objectives must be "strictly in accord with the
manpower, resources and capabilities of one's own country
and the countries of the coalition." (Skirdo 1970, 98)
Hence, Soviet political, and therefore war, objectives for
terminating a future conflict are likely to be tempered by
an awareness of their military capabilities and alliance
constraints.
Although the Soviets possess formidable military
capabilities, including a robust nuclear arsenal, their
desire to maintain control over the course of events may
lead them to restrict their use of nuclear weapons to an
intra-war deterrent role— for example, to discourage U.S.
and/or third-power nuclear escalation. The possibility
(and the potential utility) of nuclear employment is not
denied. However, in some circumstances, the Soviets might
well prefer to conduct a rapid conventional operation,
unhindered by the effects of nuclear weapons, in order to
quickly defeat NATO and remove U.S. influence from Europe.
Termination upon the attainment of such objectives would
leave much of Europe intact for future Soviet exploitation.
The Soviets express the need to quickly secure their
objectives in a future war, perhaps because they recognize
the current geographical limits of effective conventional
operations as well as the potential for American
reinforcements to prolong the conflict and possibly even
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shift the course of the war. Therefore, Soviet objectives
may be limited and time urgent.
Moreover, the limits of Soviet control over the NSWP
countries due to the faults in alliance cohesion may
increase the urgency for quickly attaining objectives and
terminating a war. The NSWP forces are likely critical to
Soviet military strategy; thus, the integral role of these
forces, combined with the dangers of prolonged operations,
may interact to limit Moscow's objectives for terminating a
war against NATO. Objectives that strain the cohesion of
the Warsaw Pact may undermine the empire the Soviets could
be seeking to expand in a war and might ultimately result
in a devastating defeat for the Kremlin.
Hence, the limits of conventional warfare and the
constraints of alliance dynamics could interact in Soviet
strategy to limit objectives for terminating a future war
in Europe. The attainment of these objectives in Europe
would likely establish functional Soviet hegemony over the
continent, a threat identified in the 1988 National
Security Strategy of the United States as endangering
America's "most basic national security interests."
(Reagan, 1)
Although this thesis has concluded that the Soviets
might pursue limited objectives for terminating a future
war in Europe, it would be unwise for the West to derive
any comfort from such an analysis, should it be accurate.
133
It appears that the Soviets would prefer not to use the
vehicle of war to attain the ultimate victory of Communism.
The Soviets appear determined, however, to do their best to
ensure that the outcome of a future war, should such a
conflict take place, would advance their progress toward
such a final victory.
134
APPENDIX: THE OBJECTIVE OF WAR TERMINATION:
THE WESTERN VIEW
A. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 137
B. UNLIMITED OBJECTIVES 139
1. Problems with Unlimited Objectives 140
a. Illusory Objective 141
b. Political Disconnect 142







2 Military Capabilities 149
3 . Public Pressure 150
4 . Problems with Limiting Objectives 152
a. Political Resistance 152
b. Military Resistance 157
c. Escalation 158
d. Communication 161
D. LIMITED OBJECTIVES 166
1 Preserving the Spoils 168
2 Realpolitik 170
3 Revenge Avoidance 172
4 Problems with Limited Objectives 174
a. The Rationality Assumption 174
b. Intoxication with Success 177
135




War as an End 18 5
E. CONCLUSION 186
136
APPENDIX: THE OBJECTIVE OF WAR TERMINATION
THE WESTERN VIEW
The following appendix is a theoretical review of the
relationship between political objectives and war
termination from the Western perspective. This appendix
expands on the concept of limited objectives by discussing
both unlimited objectives for war termination as well as
the process of limiting objectives as a war evolves.
Discussion is confined to what has been termed "external"
wars between states, thereby excluding consideration of
wars "internal" to a single state (Randle 1973, 1).
Cross references to the text of the thesis are intended
to contrast Western and Soviet perspectives on the
objective of war termination. An immediate and obvious
contrast is the detail and breadth of discussion in the
West on the topic of war termination compared to the
paucity of information in the Soviet literature.
A. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
Wars are fought for political objectives (Kecskemeti
1970, 107). According to Clausewitz, war is a
"continuation of political intercourse, carried on with
other means." (1984, 87) Political objectives guide the
conduct of the war, such as its duration and intensity, and
determine the acceptable conditions for termination (Coser
1961, 348) . Furthermore, political objectives may change
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during, and as a result of, the course of the war. Thus,
objectives for war termination may also change.*
According to Clausewitz, the primary objective of a war
is to defeat the enemy, specifically its military forces
(1984, 595-596) . However, a more generally applicable
objective of war may be some combination of attainment and
denial of one's own and the enemy's objectives.**
War's are neither all zero-sum affairs nor are they
necessarily total. Herman Kahn and his co-authors of War
Termination Issues and Concepts identify eleven outcomes
for war ranging from unconditional and total victory to
unconditional and total surrender; in between are more
ambiguous outcomes that include co-winners or co-losers
(1968, 51)
.
Thus, adversarial objectives may overlap, parallel, or
directly conflict. Moreover, objectives will differ in
ambition and intensity.
Examples of war objectives, in addition to Clausewitz 's
imperative of vanquishing the adversary's military, include
territorial and resource acquisition, promotion or
*See chapter II, section C. for discussion of the
interdependence of politics and war in Soviet strategic
thought
.
**As discussed in chapter III, for the USSR, this may
include the political and military dissolution of NATO and




infliction of punishment, preservation of a status quo
relationship, and attainment of influence or control over
the policies of another state (Randle 1973, 33-34).*
Although the objectives are varied, each is politically
motivated and likely reflects the requisite conditions for
terminating the war. More important than the specific
objectives may be the intensity and scope of the
objectives; in other words, are the objectives unlimited,
subject to change, or purposefully limited? How the
objectives correspond to these three categories may
indicate the potential for realizing the desired conditions
for terminating the war.
B. UNLIMITED OBJECTIVES
Unlimited objectives entail decisive and possibly total
termination conditions. At the least, a belligerent
seeking unlimited objectives will require severe submission
of the adversary to end the war; at most, the adversary may
cease to exist.
Total victory is the successful outcome of a war
fought for unlimited objectives.** The victor would have
established the ability to freely impose its will upon the
*See chapter II, section C. for a Soviet listing of
"Limited strategic objectives," according to Kuznetsov,
that is far more offensive in nature and which offers no
alternative other than some degree of victory.
**See chapter II, section B. for the Soviet
perspective on total victory.
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vanquished, probably by securing an unconditional
surrender.
The Allies' objective of unconditional surrender for
the Axis powers in World War II is described by Paul
Kecskemeti as "designed to make sure that the winners, in
accepting surrender, would not unwittingly permit the
survival of potential forces of aggression." (1958, 216)
Thus, the removal of the adversaries' capability to ever
commit aggression was the Allies' requisite termination
condition.
Unlimited objectives seek to decisively eliminate
threats, to establish permanent domination, to secure a
lasting peace (Kecskemeti 1958, 218). Though such
objectives may suggest the ideal outcome for a victorious
belligerent, actual attainment of this ideal is often
unrealistic. A war fought for unlimited objectives could
entail disastrous consequences for the belligerent seeking
such a total victory.
1. Problems with Unlimited Objectives
The scope of unlimited objectives may preclude
attainment. Unlimited objectives may be illusory, may be
disconnected from political requirements, and may be
ultimately pyrrhic if realized.
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a. Illusory Objective
Unlimited objectives may simply be too
difficult to realize.* In addition to complicating the war
effort, enforcement of harsh termination requirements in
the post-war environment would be problematic and could
severely strain the victor (Kaplan 1980, 74)
.
Objectives that cannot be achieved may
inevitably accumulate costs that outweigh potential
benefits (Kaplan 1980, 73) . However, the immutable and
total character of the objective may blind the belligerent
to emerging reality, as may have happened to Hitler during
World War II, and the point of optimal termination of the
war is lost (Foster and Brewer 1976, 15) . Thus, not only
is the objective unattainable but prospects for lesser
objectives for terminating the war may be foreclosed.
It is possible that unlimited objectives are
unattainable because they leave the adversary no option but
to fight. Kecskemeti, in his study Strategic Surrender
suggests that the Allies' requirement of unconditional
surrender fueled resistance by instilling the fear of
national extinction in Germany and Japan; therefore, the
war was unnecessarily prolonged and allied costs were
increased (1958, 223). However, although Kecskemeti
*See chapter II, section C. for discussion on how the
Soviet calculation of the correlation of forces and the
constraints of fighting a conventional war may interact to
prevent objectives from exceeding reality.
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recognizes the potential for an adversary's perceptions to
complicate and possibly to deny unlimited objectives, he
concludes that it was the Allies* unreasonable resistance
to pursue limited conditions for termination that actually
prolonged WWII (1958, 226-228).
b. Political Disconnect
As discussed earlier, political objectives
determine the objectives of a war. However, a war fought
for unlimited objectives may become disconnected from the
political objectives that originally motivated the
conflict.
*
Ideology is a motivating factor in conducting a
war. Because of the uncompromising nature of many
ideologies, a state may be locked into a war for unlimited
objectives that are divorced from political utility and
reality. The force of ideology may prevent political
leaders from even considering a limited settlement to a war
(Randle 1970, 85) .**
Democratic cultures may be particularly prone
to the ideological trap by perceiving war as a decisive
*See chapter II, sections A. and C. The Soviets claim
that war is the continuation of politics by other means,
thus war can never be separated from politics; rather, war
must advance political objectives.
**See chapter II, section D; chapter III, section A.
Certainly, the USSR is ideologically driven but it is
argued that the Soviets view war as advancing the victory
of communism and not necessarily securing, by itself, the
final victory of communism.
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crusade of good over evil, thereby neglecting political
considerations (Kecskemeti 1958, 26). One study suggests
that the clash of ideologies contributed to Franklin
Roosevelt's refusal to consider terminating WWII short of
the total defeat and unconditional surrender of the Axis
forces (Dornan and others 1978, 7).
Wars may be fought between opposing coalitions.
A minimal objective in such wars is for a coalition to
emerge from battle intact. However, a quest for unlimited
objectives may complicate efforts to maintain alliance
cohesion for several reasons. First, the difficult demands
placed on belligerents aspiring to unlimited objectives may
internally strain the belligerents and thus adversely
affect the coalition (Kaplan 1980, 74).
Second, reaching a consensus over the
importance of unlimited objectives and the strategy for
attaining the objectives could divide rather than unite the
alliance (Kaplan 1980, 77) . Thus, seeking to terminate a
war upon achieving decisive objectives may undermine the
foundations of security provided by an alliance while
failing to secure the desired objectives.
Future wars may involve the use of nuclear
weapons to secure political objectives; however, the use of
*See chapter IV. The fragility of the Warsaw Pact
suggests the need for the Soviets to limit their objectives
for war termination rather than risk the dissolution of
their current security system.
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nuclear weapons may actually be counter-productive to
certain objectives (Fox 1970, 10) . For example, even if
objectives are initially limited, the potential damage
involved in fighting a nuclear war could result in a loss
of political control over military actions, thereby
creating a sequence of destruction devoid of political
purpose (Gray 1986, 84) . Furthermore, as pointed out by
Kecskemeti, a large scale nuclear war that could destroy a
majority of the belligerents' populations would serve no
political purpose (1970, 112-113).*
War-fighting that becomes removed from
political objectives fosters a war with no purpose. It may
be that as objectives approach the extreme of totality, the
potential for political disconnect increases,
c. Pyrrhic Objectives
Unlimited objectives have the potential to
achieve total victory; they also may lead to a pyrrhic
victory, especially in a nuclear war (Kahn, Pfaff, and
Stillman 1968, 51). As one source noted, objectives that
are too unlimited could see the "spoils of victory turned
to ashes." (Kaplan 1980, 74)
Nuclear war plainly has the potential to wreak
grave mutual destruction upon the adversaries in the
*See chapter II, section C. , 2.; chapter III, section
D.
, 1. for political and military reasons why the Soviets
may prefer fighting a conventional war.
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conflict. Moreover, unknown ecological damage resulting
from nuclear use could pose a broader global threat. Thus,
pursuing unlimited objectives through a strategic nuclear
war could produce no victor.* Even an intended limited
nuclear use could rapidly escalate if severe time
constraints obscured decision-making.**
However, the controllability of nuclear war is
not at issue here; rather the question is whether nuclear
weapons can contribute to the successful attainment of
unlimited objectives. One possible outcome of the
employment of nuclear weapons toward such objectives is a
pyrrhic victory which does not serve a rational political
purpose. Rationality is only likely to be evident through
objectives that seek more limited conditions for war
termination.
C. LIMITING OBJECTIVES
States may enter a war with firm objectives. However,
the course of the war is likely to affect the probabilities
associated with the realization of those objectives.
Frequently, objectives must be tempered to coincide with
*See chapter II, section C. , 2. The Soviets have
declared that nuclear war could produce no victors yet the
Soviets have also claimed to be the inevitable victor in a
future war.
**See Wohlstetter, 1985 for further discussion on
potential ecological and control problems postulated in
nuclear war scenarios.
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the reality of the war. Thus, conditions for termination
may be reduced as the war progresses.*
There are numerous reasons for limiting objectives
during a war such as a deterioration in the military
situation, exhaustion of resources, internal social and
political unrest, or simply the realization that the
original objectives are unattainable (Handel 1978, 70-71).
However, recognition of and adjustment to these reasons may
hinge on rationality.
1. Rationality
To limit objectives in accordance with the reality
of war implies greater rationality than may be involved in
the pursuit of unlimited or unyielding objectives. As the
war unfolds, a rational belligerent will evaluate the
potential political and military benefits and costs of a
war and may adjust objectives accordingly (Kecskemeti 1958,
20-21) . An assessment of the prospects and desire for
achieving objectives must be a continual process for the
rational belligerent (Williams 1981, 375)
.
A state compelled to modify its objectives may be
more inclined to pursue a negotiated settlement of the war
(Pillar 1983, 47-48). A rational assumption is that "the
continuation of a war is riskier than a negotiated
*See chapter II, section C. , 3. for two possible
historical examples where the USSR might have subsequently
limited its objectives as the war progressed.
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settlement (the outcome of a war being more uncertain than
the results of a particular settlement)." (Wittman 1979,
757) Such rational assumptions would require correct
assessment of the adversary's perceptions of the war in
order to develop a potentially mutually acceptable
termination strategy (Foster and Brewer 1976, 5)
.
Circumstances that may induce a rational state to
negotiate a settlement, thereby implicitly limiting its
objectives, are varied. Although an advantage on the
battlefield could reduce the inclination toward
negotiation, such an advantage could also increase the
incentive to negotiate because of the improved bargaining
position (Pillar 1983, 49). For example, although the
prospects for further military success were probable once
the U.S. pushed communist forces across the 38th parallel
for the second time in the Korean War, the Americans
instead accelerated efforts toward a negotiated settlement
(Pillar 1983, 49) .
Should a belligerent find itself losing a war,
however, a rational decision might be to negotiate an end
to the war while significant bargaining assets, such as
military forces, are in possession (Fox 1970, 10).
However, it must be noted that rationality implies a
reasonable assessment of the war; a correct prediction of
the war's probable development; an accurate anticipation of
the adversary's assessments and intentions; and an
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allowance for errors in these formulations (Carroll 1969,
3 02) . Thus, rational behavior and accurate prediction are
problematic.
Surrender may be a rational choice if the loser
maintains enough bargaining strength to negotiate minimally
acceptable terms (Kecskemeti 1958, 19) . Although such
terms may be severe, surrender may have attractions
(Kecskemeti 1958, 13). For example, a state might feel
compelled to surrender if, in doing so, its core values
could still be maintained (Kecskemeti 1958, 14).
Other incentives for surrender may include
exhaustion from the war effort or the need to conserve
remaining strength for future action (Kecskemeti 1958, 14).
For example, Lenin signed the severe treaty of Brest-
Litovsk with the Germans in WWI that amounted to a
de-facto Russian surrender but permitted the Bolsheviks to
conserve and concentrate resources on the consolidation of
power in Russia (Ulam 1974, 73-74). However, the most
salient reason and critical incentive for surrender may be
the maintenance of national or political existence,
especially in a nuclear war (Kecskemeti 1958, 236).
Whether nuclear force employment would be rational
or not would be contingent on the specific circumstances.
However, terminating a nuclear war before control is lost
would obviously be wholly rational (although the problems
of distinguishing when a nuclear war may be out of control
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are not well understood) . Many analysts presume that total
victory in a nuclear war is unlikely because of the loss of
control that a large-scale nuclear war could induce (Kahn,
Pfaff , and Stillman 1968, 120) . Therefore, a rational
government maybe more likely to negotiate a compromise in a
limited war prior to a loss of control (Kahn, Pfaff, and
Stillman 1968, 120)
.
Time may be another rational incentive to
negotiate an end to a war. Even if a belligerent maintains
a military advantage in a war, foresight may indicate the
precarious duration of this advantage and therefore require
a termination of the war to retain the objectives currently
in hand (Handel 1978, 70-71).* Conversely, if a
belligerent is losing a war with little prospect for
improvement or further support, time will only worsen its
position; thus settlement would seem a rational imperative
(Handel 1978, 70-71) .
2 . Military Capabilities
A deterioration in the military situation that
degrades prospects and capabilities for conducting the war
may have the greatest influence in limiting objectives and
adjusting termination conditions (Handel 1978, 70). If a
belligerent finds itself losing the war, ambitious
*See chapter III, section D. , 3. and 5. The uncertain
variable of time is a likely Soviet motivation toward
achieving of rapid victory.
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objectives may require modification; if a belligerent is
winning a war, it still may not possess the capabilities to
achieve its original termination conditions.
Military capabilities to attain objectives change
during the course of a war. Battlefield defeats and the
attrition of resources throughout the war will inevitably
make the achievement of objectives more difficult and
possibly prohibitive (Pillar 1983, 46). Conversely, one
side's defeat is likely to be the adversary's victory and
resource depletion may be relative as one side gains an
advantage (Pillar 1983, 46).* It is the loss of advantage
that may compel a belligerent to limit its objectives.
As Fred Ikle points out in his classic book Every
War Must End , "[t]o bring the fighting to an end, one
nation or the other almost always has to revise its war
aims." (1971, 96) According to Ikle, military prospects
often dictate the need for and the extent of the revision
in objectives (1971, 96)
.
3 . Public Pressure
Another salient reason for limiting objectives may
be a turn in public attitudes against the war effort, such
as occurred to the United States during the Vietnam War
(Handel 1978, 63). Such pressure is most likely to be felt
and have an effect on the objectives of open, democratic
*See chapter III, section D. Both of Pillar's points
are similarly recognized by the Soviets.
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societies, given the insulation of the decision-making
process characteristic in closed, totalitarian governments
(Handel 1978, 63) .
*
Reasons that public pressure may shift against the
war include the length of the war, war-related economic
difficulties, battlefield defeats, and the threat of worse
defeat or invasion (Randle 1973, 432-433). In addition, a
shift in national values that unseats the moral
underpinning of the war may force the limiting of
objectives (Randle 1970, 78).
Severe casualties, both military and civilian, may
also turn public support against the war (Beer and Mayer
1986, 100). In his historically based study on battle
casualties and population losses as predictors of war
termination, Frank Klingberg suggests that "when population
losses approach three of four percent, a critical period
may have been reached in the nation's morale." (1966, 148)
Leading or following public pressure may be the
influence of legislative bodies, mass media, and
intellectual and business groups (Randle 1970, 79-81).
Each may have a significant impact on the limits that the
public forces upon the termination conditions of the
respective belligerent.
*See chapter III, section C. , 3. The vulnerability of
democratic societies is surely recognized by the Soviets,
given their emphasis on the public battle.
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4 . Problems with Limiting Objectives
The limiting of objectives during a war does not
mean that the adversary will reciprocate to draw the sides
closer to termination. Moreover, rational behavior by one
belligerent is no assurance of similar action by the enemy.
Yet, the adversary may not pose the only problem to
adjusting objectives and thus to prospects for ending a
war; domestic influences can also intervene to inhibit
rational war termination.
a. Political Resistance
As previously noted, resolving a war often
requires political "reorientation" of values and attitudes,
characterized by a modification of objectives by the loser
as well as the winner (possibly in order to convince the
loser of the utility of termination) (Kecskemeti 1970,
113) . However, reorientation of values is not easy,
especially if a rigid ideology underpins the political
system (Kecskemeti 1970, 113-114)
.
It has been suggested that a change in
government is one way to "devalue" or "de-ideologize" a war
(Randle 1973, 13).* It may be the possibility of such an
upheaval that entrenches a regime in the stubborn pursuit
of unrealistic objectives (Ikle 1971, 98) . Moreover, a
See chapter III, section. Soviet wartime diplomacy




government that attempts to end a war it is losing may be
ending its own regime—a potential result of either the
settlement with the adversary or internal upheaval (Ikle
1971, 69) . Thus, fear for regime survival may lock the
government in a losing cause rather than promoting
negotiations toward some minimally favorable settlement.
Ikle refers to the "treason of the hawks" who,
by requiring success as the sole condition for termination,
may fight for too much, for too long, or even for too
little and thereby harm themselves and their country (1971,
61-64). As stated by Ikle,
In so many crises of war termination, 'hawks' have
grossly neglected threats to the political future of
their nation in stubborn pursuit of some secondary
objectives, such as territorial possessions at the
periphery of their homeland or ephemeral arrangements
regarding the military balance.... Engrossed by real or
imaginary opportunities on the military front, they
redouble their efforts for short-term gains. (1971,
81-82)
Although peace may be desired, the possibility
of accepting defeat is rejected (Coser 1961, 352).
Furthermore, a renunciation of objectives, even if a return
to the pre-war status quo is possible, may be unacceptable
if perceived as a defeat (O'Connor 1969, 380).
Therefore, hollow hopes for a military
reversal, increased foreign assistance, better negotiating
conditions, or "that some untoward event will adversely
affect the enemy's capacity to wage war" (Randle 1970, 84)
may prolong a war beyond reasonable costs. What is lost,
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observes Ikle, is the everyday notion of "[c]utting one's
losses." (1971, 83)* Thus, in prolonging an unsuccessful
war, greater losses are incurred than would have been had
objectives been limited (Ikle 1971, 83)
.
It may be especially difficult for political
leaders to limit or abandon objectives for which grave
sacrifices in lives have been made (Ikle 1971, 98)
.
Although it was noted earlier that the public can influence
the limiting of war objectives, the public may also
encourage the continuation of the war to justify the costs
incurred (Foster and Brewer 1976, 15)
.
Depending on the intent of the government,
public pressure could either support policies that prolong
the war or constrain political activities that might
otherwise seek an early termination. In the latter case,
convincing the public that the national interest lies in
terminating the war may be as difficult as originally
demonstrating to a public the imperative of fighting a war
(Coser 1961, 351) .**
*See chapter III, section D. , 2. Soviet wartime
diplomacy might attempt to remind Western nations of the
advantage of cutting losses by implicit and, possibly,
explicit reminders of Moscow's potential to dominate
escalation.
**Soviet support would likely be readily forthcoming to
convince Western publics that their national interest lies
in terminating a war with the Soviets, provided Moscow's
interests were served. See chapter III, section C. , 3.
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For instance, much inflammatory rhetoric nay be
showered upon the public to secure its support for the war;
any limitation or compromise in the war may be seer, as
treason, based on ingrained perceptions of the enemy
(O'Connor 1969, 379). Ikle identifies Italy in 1943 as an
example where domestic pressures to continue fighting
contributed to the government's failure to limit its
objectives and negotiate a favorable war termination
(1971, 34-35).
Internal political struggles could also
complicate the limiting of objectives and the termination
of a war. Although certain factions may seek to terr.ir.ate
the war, other parties may implore the pursuit of the
original objectives (Coser 1961, 350). ":r example,
according to Ikle, although members within the German
government in WWI predicted the inevitable stalemating of
the war, the objective of acquiring territory on the
eastern and western fronts was not abandoned and the
regime, Germany, and much of Europe suffered the
consequences (1971, 8-9).
The study of the Boer War by C.R. Mitchell and
Michael Nicholson presented in the Journal of Conflict
Resolution illustrates the effects of internal struggle on
war termination. In general, they conclude that "different
*These factions would be likely targets for Soviet
wartime diplomacy. See chapter III, section C, 1.
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preference orderings or utility functions within parties in
conflict can have a major impact in determining when a war
will end and when a peace settlement will finally be agreed
upon." (Mitchell and Nicholson 1983, 515) The study notes
that internal struggles are applicable to single
governments as well as alliances (Mitchell and Nicholson
1983, 516).
The alliance Mitchell and Nicholson refer to
was between the independent governments of Transvaal and
the Orange Free State in opposition to Great Britain.
Differences in objectives for fighting and terminating the
war with the British forged an unproductive cleavage
between the two parties and may have contributed to their
defeat (Mitchell and Nicholson 1983, 515).
Thus, alliances are not always united in
objectives. It is probable that alliance members differ in
perspectives, capabilities, and doctrine (Randle 1973,
123) . Such differences are likely to impact on objectives
and could, similar to disputes within a government, either
prolong or shorten a war.*
The internal dispute within a single
government, as described by Mitchell and Nicholson, was
between the British political and military administrations
*See chapter IV. It is argued that the Warsaw Pact
would serve to constrain Soviet objectives, possibly
requiring a shorter war.
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in South Africa. The former sought the unconditional
surrender of the Boers; the latter supported pursuit of a
negotiated settlement (Mitchell and Nicholson 1983,
511-512) . As a result of the dispute, the war effort may




As illustrated by Mitchell and Nicholson, the
internal dispute is often between military and political
leaders. War inevitably enhances the power of the military
as diplomacy is subordinated to war-fighting concerns;
however, this sudden power may create opportunity for
internal conflict (Ikle 1971, 13)
.
A military is trained to win wars; to seek a
termination under unfavorable conditions runs contrary to
most military thought (Handel 1978, 61). Just as with much
of the Japanese military elite during WWII, military
leaders often "refuse to admit that a war has been lost or
cannot be decisively won." (Handel 1978, 61) Thus, limiting
objectives may be antithetical to military proclivities.*
In addition to rejecting compromise in a losing
effort, with battlefield success, military leaders may also
become opposed to settlement (Handel 1978, 62). For
*Soviet recognition of such military proclivities
might offer of partial explanation of Soviet plans for
attacks upon military C 2 . See chapter III, section D.
,
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example, Handel describes the Allied High Command's
objection to an armistice with Germany in WWI once the
allies had established an advantage (Handel 1978, 62).
More often, as Kecskemeti points out, military
leaders who reject limiting objectives have over-estimated
their capabilities in a losing effort thereby securing a
disastrous outcome (1970, 108). Kecskemeti refers to this
as the "Irreversibility Principle" where a military trend
is evaluated as not having stabilized and therefore still
reversible (1970, 108). Having made this faulty
evaluation, the military (as well as the political) leaders
fall into the trap of devoting additional reserves and
resources to a war effort to secure an outcome beyond reach
(Kecskemeti 1970, 108) . Hence, instead of limiting
objectives and possibly terminating the war while
negotiating power is still evident, capabilities are
squandered and the consequences of defeat are exacerbated,
c. Escalation
Related to Kecskemeti ' s "Irreversibility
Principle" is the problem of escalation. It may be that
both political and military leaders, indoctrinated in the
psychology of power, are averse to limiting objectives.
Political and military leaders may assume that the
adversary will yield first, thus a more total victory
rather than a limited compromise may be pursued (Quester
1970, 34) . In this case, escalation may seem the logical
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response, even if events are running counter to
expectations.
Although the reasons for not limiting
objectives are quantitatively similar to those favoring
limitation, they may seem qualitatively superior to
political and military decision-makers. Reasons for not
limiting objectives may include perceptions of political,
military, and economic advantages; belief that time favors
one's own cause; prospects of increased capabilities and
support; domestic stability; and an evaluation that
negotiations offer little promise (Handel 1978, 70-71).
The danger lies in the intoxicating potential
of distorted perceptions concerning the panacea of
escalation. Unfounded expectations assigned to unfeasible
objectives may block consideration of alternatives,
therefore prolonging and possibly escalating a war "long
past the point where a 'rational' calculation would
indicate that the war should be ended...." (Ikle 1971, 16)
Especially in a losing effort, according to
Ikle, escalation becomes an irrational "mental escape" for
the decision-maker (1971, 56) . For such a decision-maker,
notes Ikle, the "sense of reality seems to shrink as he is
being pushed closer to the agonizing choice between
surrender, on the one hand, and seeing his country occupied
or destroyed, on the other." (1971, 56)
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Similarly, Kecskemeti observed that wars tend
to become more total as belligerents are faced with defeat
or even stalemate; in such cases, prolongation and possibly
escalation, rather than termination, may become the
preferred options (1958, 18). Moreover, escalation is not
necessarily the desperate response of an irrational
decision-maker. Even for the rational leader, impending
defeat may not be evident, thus escalation may seem
reasonably promising (Mitchell 1981, 181).*
Even if the losing side resists temptations to
escalate, the adversary may seek to exploit its advantage
by expanding its objectives, possibly through escalation
(Ikle 1971, 13) . It is also possible that the belligerent
winning a war may escalate the conflict to induce the
adversary to surrender. In either case, a more favorable
or a quicker termination is not necessarily ensured for the
belligerent conducting the escalation (Holsti 1966, 278).
Although a successful escalation strategy may
ensure victory or convince the adversary to seek peace,
escalation may also prompt counter-escalation; may increase
the military, economic, and social costs of the war; and
may extend the perimeter of destruction over previously
The Soviets may expect that by exploiting their
potential ability to dominate escalation, the West could be
convinced of the futility of initiating escalation, thereby
precluding the mutually debilitating effects of such a
process. See chapter III, section D. , 2.
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unaffected homeland. Moreover, rather than shortening the
war, escalation might further entrench the fighting and
widen the gap for settlement as the stakes accumulate for
the belligerents involved. (Ikle 1971, 40-41)*
Rather than escalation, George Quester suggests
that de-escalation is a prerequisite for promoting the
process of war termination (186, 61). However,
de-escalation would have to be a mutual process; a
unilateral de-escalation might only be a perceived by the
adversary as an opportunity to increase its objectives and
exploit an emerging advantage (Wittman 1979, 752). Thus, as
noted by Quester, de-escalation would be difficult to
conduct and verify, assuming that the intent was
successfully communicated and mutually accepted (1986, 61) .
d. Communication
A belligerent that achieves its objectives or
limits its objectives enough to seek an end to the war must
still communicate, in some form, its desire to engage in
the termination process. Furthermore, the adversary must
agree to at least participate in the communication and
eventual negotiation process in order to end the war in a
manner short of total obliteration.
*The Soviets may view escalation as a possible option
in a future war; however, their desire to maintain control
may preclude certain escalation strategies. See chapter
II, section C. , 2.; chapter III, section D. , 1. and 2.
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However, agreeing to communicate and to
negotiate may be the essence of the problem of war
termination. The limiting of objectives requires compromise
but the adversaries may not be prepared to bargain in good
faith toward such a compromise (Holsti 1966, 276)
.
As previously described, a belligerent's
perception of the war may coincide with the military
situation which in turn may affect the desire to negotiate
a termination of the war. Because perceptions and
situations will differ among the belligerents, it cannot
be presumed that desires to negotiate will coincide
(Pillar 1983, 54). For example, it is possible that a
participant in a war will resist any move toward
communication and negotiation until an advantage is
secured (Craig and George 1983, 225). Should each
belligerent pursue such a prerequisite, war termination
will inevitably be postponed (Craig and George 1983, 225).
Moreover, a certain stigma may be attached to
negotiating with the enemy. Desire to negotiate may be seen
by the adversary as a sign of weakness or an admission of
defeat (Carroll 1969, 309) . In addition, a belligerent may
perceive negotiation as cheapening its war effort, thereby
hardening the desire not to compromise war objectives (Ikle
1971, 85-86) . Negotiation may also inadvertently prolong
the war, should one side draw the conclusion that the
adversary is about to concede; assuming this, a belligerent
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may forego bargaining and seek a military victory expected
to yield greater results (Quester 1970, 34)
.
When the point in a war is reached where one or
all parties are ready to negotiate, the actual
communication may still be a problem. Foremost is the
question of who to negotiate with. It may not be clear who
is leading the adversary, given possible internal upheaval
within a government during a war (Mitchell 1981, 193).*
The problem of uncertainty is exacerbated if, for example,
an internal struggle within an adversary generates a split
in the control of military forces (Mitchell 1981, 193)
.
Once the leadership is identified, it may then
be realized that the means of communication are inadequate
for several reasons (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 122).
First, diplomatic channels are often severed at the onset
of hostilities, thereby eliminating a common peacetime
avenue of communication (Holsti 1966, 279). Although
diplomacy may eventually be instrumental in terminating a
war, the early absence of diplomatic channels to convey
objectives may preclude a quicker end to the war.**
*If the Soviets destroy the leadership (see chapter
III, section D. , 5., a. and d.), they may not have a
negotiating partner. However, if the Soviets succeed in
installing favorable governments, communication and
subsequent negotiation may be readily facilitated. See
chapter III, section C. , 2.
**Soviet wartime diplomacy might seek to avoid
unnecessary prolonging of a war. See chapter III, section
C. and D. , 2
.
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Second, the signaling of intent, in the absence
of direct communications, may be an ineffective substitute.
As expressed by T.R. Fox, "the central question in the
typical problem of war termination remains how one side can
maximize the chance that its peace overtures will elicit a
favorable response from the other side" (1970, 12)
;
signaling may not be an adequate answer to this question.
Problems with signaling start with "the limits
of human intellectual competence." (Quester 1970, 33).
Specifically, a signal may be missed or misperceived by the
recipient or signal clarity may be overrated by the sender
(Quester 1970, 33)
.
Moreover, a signal is subject to the inherent
distrust that will exist between wartime adversaries
(Quester 1970, 35) . It would not be unreasonable for a
belligerent to send a misleading or deceptive signal in
order to derive some type of advantage, thus it is not
unreasonable for an adversary to disbelieve the signals of
its foe (Williams 1981, 378).*
A signal consisting of a unilateral action such
as a cease fire, although risky, may be required if the
siqnal is to be effective. Otherwise, the question posed by
Quester becomes rhetorical: "Even if war termination
*Lack of Western credibility and fear of deception
might be a problem for Warsaw Pact countries that might
otherwise desire to rebel against Soviet domination. See
chapter IV, sections C. , 4., b. and d.
164
signals are clear, can anyone dare to terminate a war on
the basis of them, if such signals do not seem to bind the
signaler?" (1970, 37)
Finally, there is the problem of the technical
aspects of communication. Necessary elements in a wartime
communication structure include an acknowledged command
authority; surviving command centers; attack warning and
assessment capabilities; and intelligence information on
the condition of allies, adversaries, and neutrals, as
well as one's own country (Leahy [1988], 171-174).
Communications, in addition to those between adversaries,
must be maintained to one's own military forces, to command
nodes within the government, to allies and neutrals, and to
the civilian population (Leahy [1988], 172-173).*
Maintaining communications to one's own
military forces is critical to the success of political
signaling and the limiting of objectives. For example, the
failure to coordinate political and military efforts could
undermine attempts at a cease fire or intentions to
de-escalate military operations (Quester 1970, 33)
.
Survivable communications are, of course,
crucial to the war termination process. However, under the
Communication and overall control in a nuclear war
may be especially problematic. Therefore, the Soviets may
prefer to contain combat to the conventional level. See
chapter II, section C. , 2.; chapter III, section D. , 1.
;
chapter IV, section C. , 3.
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potentially severe conditions of modern warfare, it is not
hard to envision difficulties in maintaining some or all
of the demanding communication requirements. Thus, given a
desire to limit objectives, a belligerent may be unable to
communicate such intent. With the inability to communicate
a desire or intention to limit objectives, the war would
probably continue.
D. LIMITED OBJECTIVES
The primary question in this section is whether a
state may enter a war with objectives other than the total
defeat of the enemy that, once attained, define the
conditions for terminating the war. To fight a war for
definite, limited objectives implies forethought and
rationality prior to entering a war, as well as during the
fighting.* In general, such objectives aim toward
obtaining specific benefits or avoiding impending costs
(Pillar 1983, 38)
.
Although it may be questionable to assume the
rationality that is implicit in a war fought for limited
objectives, it may not be totally unreasonable. As Kahn,
Pfaff, and Stillman point out, WWII and the Vietnam War
both could have been more unlimited but the threat of
*Such traits may be attributed to the Soviets. See
chapter II, section C. , 1.
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overwhelming destruction may have induced some rational
limitation (1968, 70).
Von Clausewitz may have best captured the rational
argument for limited objectives:
The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent,
the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you;
the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need to
make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own
political aim, the less importance you attach to it and
the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must.
(1984, 81) .*
According to Kecskemeti, unlimited war "exists only in
abstract thought; practical action is always subject to
limitations" that may include postwar political
considerations and coalition constraints (1970, 110).** In
addition, Kecskemeti recognizes that "the optimal final
outcome for a belligerent may be one that falls short of
the best military outcome he could achieve" because of the
possibility of paying "too much for victory." (1958, 20)
Therefore, recognition of the limitations in formulating
termination objectives could enhance the prospects for
success while eliminating the costs incurred during a quest
for total victory.***
*See chapter III. It is argued that in a war with
NATO, the Soviets may follow Clausewitz 's advice.
**See chapter IV. Coalition constraints may limit
Soviet objectives.
***This is a primary argument in this thesis for limited
Soviet objectives for war termination.
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1. Preserving the Spoils
Warfare is costly in military, civilian, and
material terms as well as in other opportunities that are
sacrificed in pursuit of war objectives (Pillar 1983, 38).
Because such costs are inherent in a war, the spoils of war
or the gains accumulated through the fulfillment of
objectives must be enduring and must justify and minimize
the sacrifices.* Limited objectives may best fulfill
these intentions.
Preserving gains may be a particularly precarious
process, given the nature of modern weapons. Thus, limited
objectives may acquire greater urgency in a future war. For
example, it is unlikely, even in the worst case, that
either the U.S. or the USSR could be totally disarmed in a
nuclear first strike. Therefore, each may retain
substantial capability to damage the adversary.
Hence, given the devastating potential of either
side to deny the other the spoils of victory, should a war
occur, the incentive may exist to limit objectives and
possibly the nature of the war to a conventional level (Abt
1985, 42). As noted by Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman, "the
presence of nuclear weapons is likely to prove a powerful
*See chapter II, section D. ; chapter III, section E.
For the Soviets, it is argued that the gains of war could
serve as the basis for a greater vicotry, thus such spoils
must be preserved.
168
inducement to clear and/or cautious thinking" about the
conduct and objectives of a war (1968, 66)
.
Kecskemeti concludes that nuclear weapons force
states to "accustom themselves to thinking in terms of
relatively small political payoffs"; otherwise, the risk is
a devastating loss (1958, 257). To lose more than is
initially possessed or to have gains destroyed would
violate an ancient objective of war. Sun Tzu advised in
500BC that the aim of war "must be to take All-under-
Heaven intact," thus ensuring that "troops are not worn
out and... gains will be complete." (1971, 79) In a
large-scale nuclear war, gains may not be intact or even
usable.*
Conventional war may be most appropriate for the
attainment of limited objectives, given the potential
effects of nuclear war (Kaplan 1980, 73) . If the war
objectives include territorial or resource acquisition,
conventional war may be more appropriate for maintaining
the utility of the objectives (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman
1968, 60)
.
Thus, gains may be lost because objectives are not
limited enough. A belligerent that, rather than seeking
termination upon the attainment of certain objectives,
*See chapter II, section C. , 2.; chapter III, section
D. , 1. It is possible the Soviets recognize both
productive and counterproductive effects of nuclear weapons
and may adjust their military strategy accordingly.
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pursues further gains may overextend its capabilities and
defeat itself (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 120).*
Moreover, for a belligerent at a disadvantage in a
war, failure to be bound by limited objectives, such as
forcing a stalemate, could be disastrous (Kahn, Pfaff, and
Stillman 1968, 120). A firm commitment to carefully
calculated objectives could avoid over-extension and self-
inflicted defeat.
Perhaps the optimal way to preserve the gains of
war may be to quickly secure the objectives and seek an
early termination of the war (Handel 1978, 68). A rapid war
would most likely imply significantly limited objectives
but the minimal benefits derived from secured gains may
grossly outweigh the costs of flawed ambitions.**
2 . Realpolitik
Limited objectives imply not only rationality but
also a realistic acceptance of the constraints upon power.
Should, for example, the total defeat of an adversary be
realized, the victor may still be unable to fill the
sudden "vacuum of power" or to cope with the disruption
*See chapter III, section D. , 1. and 5., b. In the
example of Europe, it is possible the Soviets intend to
exploit, rather than to destroy, Western resources.
**See chapter III, section D. , 3. It is likely that
the Soviets would seek the attainment of their objectives
quickly and without over-extension, perhaps in the initial
period of a war.
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of a previous balance of power (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman
1968, 60)
.
A limited objective, therefore, may aim to preserve
some form of authority in a country or territory for
several reasons (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 60).
First, once the objectives are secured, the process of
termination requires an authority to negotiate with
(Schelling 1966, 128). Second, an authority with which to
communicate the limits of the objectives may facilitate
negotiation and an easier termination (Kahn, Pfaff, and
Stillman 1968, 119). Finally, maintaining an authority with
the power to control domestic affairs may relieve the
victor of costly administration and reconstruction of a
devastated, anarchic territory (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman
1968, 117) .*
For example, C.R. Mitchell notes that the U.S.
consciously decided to maintain a Japanese government after
WWII to conduct an orderly surrender and to assist in
post-war administration, thereby minimizing American
difficulties and costs (1981, 178-179)
.
Furthermore, the maintenance of an authority and
restraint in a belligerent's objectives may facilitate the
*Soviet limited objectives in Europe may aspire to
either maintain present leadership to negotiate termination
or, probably preferably, to install a favorable government.
In either case, the merits of maintaining some form of
indigenous authority may be recognized by the Soviets. See
chapter III, section C.
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reintegration of a losing state into the international
order (Kaplan 1980, 81) . This may be particularly
significant in a region with a precarious balance of power.
If, for example, a losing belligerent is left unduly weak,
it may be open to attack or exploitation by a third party,
possibly requiring rescue by the same belligerent that
fostered its vulnerability (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman
1968, 116)
.
A belligerent that is forced to carry on a losing
struggle because its adversary leaves it no option other
than unconditional surrender is only further weakened, thus
more subject to third party exploitation (Kecskemeti 1958,
229) . Moreover, in the quest for unconditional surrender, a
belligerent may inadvertently create an opportunity for
third party imposition upon the spoils of victory.
For example, according to Kecskemeti, the U.S.
insistence on a Japanese unconditional surrender in WWII
forged the opening for the Soviet Union's brief but
profitable (from Moscow's perspective) involvement in the
war and the subsequent settlement in Asia (1958, 229).
Thus, limited objectives may be more realistically
attainable as well as retainable upon terminating the war.
3 . Revenge Avoidance
Ideally, the attainability of limited objectives is
accompanied by a reasonable degree of palatability for the
adversary. The attractiveness of termination to a
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belligerent may correlate to the severity of the costs of
the war; in other words, the more limited the objectives of
the adversary, the more acceptable the termination may be
for the loser (Coser 1961, 349).
However, objectives that are extensive and a
settlement that is harsh may sow the seeds of revenge in
the historical memory of the loser (Kahn, Pfaff, and
Stillman 1968, 111-112). A harsh peace imposed upon a
vanquished state may perpetuate domestic unrest and
deprivation which in turn may encourage sentiments for
vengeance similar to those developed in Germany after WWI
(Kaplan 1980, 83) .
In a war between the U.S. and the USSR, the primary
boundary for objectives may be that which precludes the
crossing of the nuclear threshold. A nuclear war that
devastates one side may still leave significant nuclear
assets available for a vindictive response. As noted by
Quester, "[ljeaving the other side with something to live
for thus gives that side a reason for restraint." (1986,
66) In other words, limited objectives may provide a
restraining incentive to the loser, therefore the winner
may be left with more than just a pyrrhic victory.*
*The Soviets may use their potential for escalation
dominance as well as communication of limited objectives in
an attempt to convince NATO countries of the desirability
of war termination on Soviet terms. Revenge avoidance may
not be a prime motivation unless the USSR fears a pyrrhic
nuclear use by the West. See chapter III, section D. , 2.
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4 . Problems with Limited Objectives
If a war is fought, limited objectives may
constrain the conflict within some bounds of reason.
However, the assumption that restraint breeds restraint may
neglect human proclivities toward escalation and revenge.
According to Clark Abt, a war between the U.S. and the
USSR, for example, that begins with limited objectives has
the potential to run out of control (1985, 45) . Regardless
of the limitations on objectives, restraint in war is
always problematic.
a. The Rationality Assumption
The assumption that a war is undertaken with
any definite conditions formulated upon which to seek
termination may overrate the rationality of the
belligerents.* The people conducting the war are not
inherently rational (Handel 1978, 56). Moreover,
rationality may decrease as the numbers of individuals
involved in the decision-making process decrease (Handel
1978, 58) . A prime example is Adolf Hitler, whose
prolongation of WWII exceeded most definitions of rational
behavior (Handel 1978, 59).
and C.
*Soviet rationality is one of the bases for the
recognition of possible limited objectives for war
termination. See chapter II, C.
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In addition, the forethought required to
develop objectives and the corresponding conditions for
termination may simply be absent (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman
1968, 50). As Ikle suggests, "the grand design is often
woefully incomplete." (1971, 1) The problem, according to
Ikle, is that "war plans tend to cover only the first act."
(1971, 8) In other words, although the course of initial
hostilities may be conceived, subsequent battles and the
inevitable conclusion are neglected (Ikle 1971, 8).*
Reasons that objectives may be poorly conceived
include domestic constraints upon military action and
conflicts between the military and political leadership
(Foster and Brewer 1976, 9).** The result may be a vague
plan that is designed to quell dissent and keep numerous
options available but that fails to create reasonable
military expectations (Foster and Brewer 1976, 9).
Furthermore, even if objectives are defined,
the process of ending the war may undermine them. Pillar
notes that as war termination is being negotiated, the
violence of the war often escalates as each side attempts
to manipulate an advantage (1983, 167). In both the Korean
War and the Vietnam War, both sides intensified combat in
*Forethought and careful planning are commonly
attributed to the Soviets. See chapter II, section C. , 1.
**Only the latter is likely to affect Soviet decision-
making.
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the final stages of the war (Pillar 1983, 168).
Escalation, however, could harden attitudes toward
settlement.
As Ikle points out, war may foster an
intolerance for "unresolved conflicts" that were deemed
acceptable during peacetime (1971, 9) . Therefore, the
increased obstinacy of the belligerents, such as occurred
during both world wars, may create unrealistic desires to
ensure a greater security and a lasting peace as conditions
for ending the war, regardless of the associated costs or
the original objectives (Ikle 1971, 9-10) . Moreover, such
desires may increase in importance as the costs of the war
mount (Ikle 1971, 12) . Termination is thus made, at best,
more difficult (Ikle 1971, 11).
Rather than definite objectives, a Rand study
on war termination suggests that wars are "more often
motivated by 'negative' objectives." (Foster and Brewer
1976, 8) In other words, wars are fought to avoid certain
outcomes and not to attain specific objectives; therefore,
objectives are poorly defined, if delineated at all (Foster
and Brewer 1976, 8).**
*Thus, the USSR may prefer to contain its potential
for escalation dominance to threats, thereby limiting
escalation costs. See chapter III, section D. , 2.




That a state enters a war with certain
objectives and that those objectives maintain focus and
definition throughout the war may assume unrealistically
rational behavior. More likely, what may occur once a war
is begun, is that "[tjhose with power to start a war
frequently come to discover that they lack the power to
stop it." (Ikle 1971, 106)
b. Intoxication with Success
Objectives that start out limited may expand
should a belligerent meet with success. Rather than
accepting, as Kecskemeti suggests, that limited objectives
may have "far-reaching political consequences" on an
adversary, a belligerent may impulsively seek to impose
such political consequences during the war (1958, 256).
However, the result of such action may inflate the costs of
the war and possibly deny even the limited objectives
originally sought.
Because a war is fought with incomplete
information about the power and objectives of an enemy, a
belligerent may be pleasantly surprised when its war
efforts achieve unanticipated success (Handel 1978, 66) .
However, success may be illusory and may lead to an
exaggeration of one's own ability and effectiveness (Mandel
1986, 176)
.
For example, a large tactical success, suggests
Fox, "may open the way to inflating war objectives, and
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thus postpone rather than hasten the day when terms of
settlement will be offered which the enemy might reasonably
be expected to accept." (1970, 6-7) Victory, as defined by
the attainment of objectives, is complicated and perhaps
ultimately denied by such lack of restraint.
Japan's early success in the 1904-1905 Russo-
Japanese War led to an increase in its objectives for
influence in Korea and Manchuria. Although the Japanese
success did lead to a more favorable settlement of the war
than originally anticipated, Japan was nevertheless anxious
to extricate itself from a land war in Asia, recognizing
the potential for the costs of the war to quickly undermine
its greater global objectives. (White 1969, 360-361)
Analyst Colin Gray writes that, based on WWI
and WWII, "the experience of prolonged war tends to promote
an increase in war's intensity and/or in war's geographical
scope." (1986, 76) It is further suggested that as wars
proceed and costs accumulate, ideological resolve
intensifies and the will to compromise wanes (Holsti 1966,
277) . Objectives may thus be prone to swelling the longer a
war continues and as ideological fervor hardens, especially
for the belligerent that is currently winning.*
*The Soviets may not be immune to such processes,




Related to the fault of becoming intoxicated
with success is the overall problem of matching strategy to
the objectives. For example, objectives that are too vague
and general may not readily facilitate an applicable
military strategy (Dunn 1987, 178). Even in the case of
specific, limited objectives, a complementary military
strategy is not necessarily forthcoming. As outlined by
Clausewitz, the problem for the belligerent is "to set no
greater military aim than would be sufficient for the
achievement of his political purpose." (1984, 585).*
However, conducting a war effort to complement
the attainment of specific objectives is problematic, at
best. Limits may be too constraining, resulting in an
ineffective military strategy and possibly enhancing the
strength and confidence of the enemy as the war endures, a
process similar to that experienced by the U.S. in Vietnam
(Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 133). Unless the military
strategy complements the political objectives, attainment
of the latter may not occur (Foster and Brewer 1976, 12)
.
Political objectives that limit military
strategy may inadvertently weaken the overall military
effort (Von Clausewitz 1984, 612). Analyst Keith Dunn
*See chapter II, section C. ; chapter III., B. , 1.
The Soviets would be expected to carefully match political
objectives and military strategy.
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suggests that U.S. presidents have increasingly tightened
civilian control over military operations and thereby
constrained the military's conduct of combat (1987, 177).
Such civilian control may ultimately hinder the military's
ability to secure victory. Moreover, objectives that do not
change or a military strategy that remains hamstrung may
incur costs far beyond the initial intentions (Pillar 1983,
174) .
Misperception is a primary culprit in forging a
strategic disconnect. Perhaps most costly would be a
miscalculation of the enemy's military potential, including
its ability to secure additional allies or assistance (Ikle
1971, 22-23).* Furthermore, it is possible to either
underestimate or to exaggerate an adversary's hostility
toward oneself, his commitment to the war effort, and the
nature of his objectives (Mandel 1986, 176) . The USSR
clearly underestimated the resolve and capabilities of
Finland during the 1939-1940 Winter War, and the Soviets
were forced to drastically revise their objectives in the
face of grave and unexpected costs (Fox 1970, 6).**
Additionally, one side's decision to fight a
war for limited objectives would not ensure complementary
*The likely wartime behavior of France, China, and
Japan may offer possible opportunities for miscalculation
by the USSR.
**Similarly, the Soviets may underestimate Western
resolve. See chapter III, section C. , 3.
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behavior from the adversary, even if such intent were
clearly communicated (Schelling 1966, 144). To assume
reciprocal behavior by the adversary could be a fatal flaw
in any political/military strategy, particularly given the
presence of nuclear weapons.*
If a war between the U.S. and the USSR took
place, each side would have to consider the tremendous
mutual capabilities to inflict devastation, regardless of
previous limits or restraints (Kecskemeti 1958, 253). Colin
Gray argues that in a protracted conventional war, the
possibility exists for one side to employ nuclear weapons,
especially to reverse a losing effort, regardless of
restraint by the adversary (1986, 85) . In a limited nuclear
war, some analysts suggest, a certain casualty threshold
may be crossed, thereby making it "impossible for
leaders... to stick to restraint and selectivity." (Sloss
and Stoppa-Liebl 1986, 117)
Thus, once initiated, a nuclear war may be
particularly difficult to terminate. For example, there may
be an inclination during the termination process, as
Quester suggests, for each side "to punish the other side a
little more, in light of what has already happened, to
prove its willingness to carry out threats, to make
*Thus, the potential may exist for the Soviet Union
to miscalculate the credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantees
for the protection of Western Europe.
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deterrence become effective again in the future." (1986,
65)
Similarly, Ikle argues that even a partial
defeat would be unacceptable in settling a nuclear war
because of a fear that a precedent would be established
that only invited further aggression (1971, 123) . Ikle
concludes that the need to avoid such a defeat would
overshadow any limited objectives to the extent that
national survival would be a forgotten strategic
consideration (1971, 123-124)
.
Hence, assumptions of mutual adversarial
restraint and overall misconceptions about the enemy may
contribute to a disconnect between limited political
objectives and military strategy. The extent of the
disconnect may determine how severely the actual
termination conditions of the war deviate from the initial
objectives.
d. Alliances
The pursuit of limited objectives in a war is
likely to be affected by the nature of an alliance involved
in the war. The assumption is made that alliances, such as
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, include a leader among the
various members (although this does not have to be the
case)
.
In such an alliance, by pursuing limited
objectives, the coalition leader may be less likely to
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alienate other alliance members and thus more likely to
secure their support (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 119).
However, even with limited war objectives, alliance
cohesion is not assured.*
Alliance cohesion may be affected by internal
dynamics of several types. First, members of an alliance
may disagree on objectives, strategy, and the eventual war
termination process (Randle 1973, 118). Success in the
latter may depend directly on alliance cohesion and
strength. If some members have defected or become neutral,
leverage in the war termination process is likely to be
diminished (Randle 1973, 120-121).**
Second, the course and outcome of the war is
not likely to produce a balanced distribution within the
alliance of the costs and benefits of the war. Dissent may
become evident in the members who suffered most and gained
least in pursuit of war objectives, especially if the
coalition leader gathers most of the spoils. (Randle 1973,
122)***
*See chapter IV for potential Soviet problems with the
Warsaw Pact.
**It is argued that the USSR might attempt to
encourage the neutrality of NATO countries (see chapter
III, section C. and D. , 2.).
***This may be a problem for the USSR. See chapter IV,




Third, a larger alliance membership may
increase the variance concerning objectives and strategy.
However, the magnitude of the variance will probably depend
on the strength and control of the alliance leader. (Randle
1973, 122)
The key point is that even a belligerent in
pursuit of limited objectives may be constrained further by
the internal dynamics of its respective coalition.* Such
constraints may be manifested in defections and separate
peace agreements signed by former alliance members with the
enemy (Foster and Brewer 1976, 15)
.
Kecskemeti proposes that in coalitions in which
members may distrust the intentions of the alliance leader,
defections or constraints of some type may be greater
(1958, 21).** An alliance maintained through coercion
(such as the Warsaw Pact) may be particularly prone to some
degree of dissolution.
Furthermore, alliance members may perform
inadequately on the battlefield or may be ineffective
because of their own internal strife (Randle 1970, 84) . In
sum, any debilitation within an alliance may shift the
correlation of forces enough to cause originally limited
*The major thesis of chapter IV.
**A possibility favoring Western interests, given
potential Soviet problems with the Warsaw Pact. See
chapter IV.
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objectives to become unattainable (Foster and Brewer 1976,
15) .
Conversely, a belligerent's actions may also be
constrained by allies that demand a greater victory. Even
if a coalition leader has achieved its limited objectives
in a war and is ready to seek termination, its alliance
partners, for better or worse, may compel the leader to
continue the war for further gain. (Foster and Brewer 1976,
15)
Thus, the internal dynamics of an alliance
could adversely affect the limited objectives of the
coalition leader, possibly leading to an unfavorable
conclusion to the war. The internal difficulties of one
alliance may represent opportunities for the rival
coalition.
*
e. War as an End
It has been observed that wars since WWII have
been limited in scope and geography. However, the process
of war has the potential to erase intentions of limited
objectives. Hostility flamed by the ferocity of battle may
blind ambitions to no less than total victory. The violence
of war may foment unyielding skepticism over possibilities
for future peace, thereby foreclosing thoughts of restraint
(Ikle 1971, 107) . War thus becomes an end in itself and
*Such difficulties and opportunities may affect both
American and Soviet strategy. See chapter III; chapter IV.
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limits short of totally defeating the enemy may be
forgotten (Foster and Brewer 197 6, 6)
.
E. CONCLUSION
Victory, one analyst suggests, "is a highly elastic
term, used to denote a wide variety of outcomes, whether
military, political, or economic." (Carroll 1980, 53)
Moreover, wars do not necessarily end in a discernible
victory and defeat (Carroll 1969, 306-307) . One way to
define victory in a war may be the relationship of pre-war
and intra-war objectives of the belligerents to the final
outcome (Carroll 1969, 305).
Thus, the objectives of the war may define the type and
the extent of the victory. The more limited the objectives,
the more realistic may be the possibility of attaining
victory. That is, total victory may be impossible, although
even a moderate victory is not certain.
However, by seeking to terminate a war upon the
achievement of calculated, limited objectives, a
belligerent may secure the foundation of a greater victory
through other means, such as political and economic
measures. It may be beyond the scope of a meaningful
victory, especially in a war between the U.S. and the USSR,
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to expect to secure the "fruit" of total victory (Carroll
1980, 69). *
Rather than seeking to absolutely destroy the
adversary's military strength, it may be sufficient to
establish in the adversary the perceptual realization that
its "position is politically and strategically equivalent
to defenselessness, " given the futility of continued
hostilities (Kecskemeti 1958, 107). The adversaries could
each then limit losses by terminating the war but a
fundamental change in relationships would have been forged
through the outcome of the war (Kecskemeti 1958, 107).
The new relationship may leave the loser vulnerable to
some degree of peacetime exploitation by the victor,
thereby establishing the basis for a greater triumph
(Carroll 1980, 69-70) . Similarly, the victor may emerge in
a position that facilitates the attainment of further
gains, as did Japan after the Russo-Japanese War (White
1969, 363- 364)
.
According to Keskemeti, "[t]he military outcome. . .will
provide a basis for distributing political payoffs," yet
"[t]he military outcome. . .does not determine the magnitude
of these payoffs, by itself." (1970, 107) The magnitude of
the payoffs will likely be expressed in the process that
*Thus, it is argued that war is only a partial means
to an end for the Soviets. See chapter II, section A. ;
chapter III, section A. and B.
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settles the war and, in the longer term, by the change in
the relationship between the belligerents.
In conclusion, limited objectives for terminating a war
may establish the basis for further political victory after
the war has ended. For the Soviet Union, it is suggested
that limited objectives in a war against NATO could be
critical to Moscow's long term struggle for victory.
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